Fort Hays State University

FHSU Scholars Repository
Master's Theses

Graduate School

Spring 2021

Remembering the Experience of War: A Sensory Study of the
Vietnam War and Collective Memory
Jacob Randolph
Fort Hays State University, jacobrandolph2511@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses
Part of the American Film Studies Commons, American Material Culture Commons, American Popular
Culture Commons, Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, Korean Studies Commons,
Military History Commons, Other American Studies Commons, Television Commons, and the United
States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Randolph, Jacob, "Remembering the Experience of War: A Sensory Study of the Vietnam War and
Collective Memory" (2021). Master's Theses. 3178.
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/theses/3178

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at FHSU Scholars Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of FHSU Scholars Repository.

REMEMBERING THE EXPERIENCE OF WAR: A SENSORY STUDY OF THE VIETNAM
WAR AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY
Being
A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the Fort Hays State University in
Partial Fulfillment of Master of Arts
By
Jacob Randolph
B.A. Fort Hays State University

Date

4/26/2021

Approved
Major Professor

Approved
Chair, Graduate Council

ABSTRACT
The Vietnam War is remembered in a variety of ways. It is remembered as a war against
communism, yet one that was also against American ideals of freedom. It is remembered as a
war of patriotism, yet one that was also against the numerous military members who fought in it.
It is remembered as a war for integration and unity among black and white, yet many AfricanAmericans remember the time period as a war being fought abroad and at home. Memory of the
war is obviously contradicting, but then again the 1960s and 1970s oftentimes were.
This thesis examines how the Vietnam War has been remembered in the American
collective memory. The Korean War, a war similar in many ways, is used as a reference for
comparison. Despite shared characteristics, people have alternative memories of each, with the
Korean War being remembered as a forgotten war. Much of these differences can be explained
through sensory history, which is a fairly new field of historical analysis.
By examining how soldiers and citizens were sensing the wars (through sight, hearing,
smelling, tasting, and touching), it becomes evident that the memory of the Vietnam War
diverges due to different cultural interpretations. Media, especially through the television, acted
both as a preserver of memory as well as a stimulator of the senses. Contradictions arose within
these memories and senses based off of cultural characteristics. The counter-memory from the
minority populations spread to the dominant memory of the whites. This split the overall
memory of the war, resulting in no clear dominant collective memory. This analysis of the
Vietnam War provides a new perspective on the war not previously done before.
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Introduction
“I looked up and there were two jets aiming directly at our command post. He’s dropped
two cans of napalm, and it’s coming toward us, loblolly, end over end. These kids… had dug a
hole or two over on the edge. I looked as the thing exploded, and two of them were dancing in
that fire. There was a rush, a roar from the air that’s being consumed and drawn in as this hell
come to earth is burning there. As that dies back a little, then you can hear the screams.
Someone yells ‘get this man’s feet!’ I reached down and the boots crumble and the flesh is
cooked off of his ankles. I feel those bones in the palms of my hands. I can feel it now.” 1 This
is how Joey Galloway, a journalist/photographer described one of his most memorable
experiences in Vietnam. This memory is rooted in an overload of sensory stimulation, between
the sights and sounds of men burning to the smell and feel of cooked flesh that ran through his
fingers. Sensory experiences at the time transcended individual memory and shaped the
collective memory of the war; however, due to the conflicting translations of these memories and
senses, American collective memory of the Vietnam War remains unclear because the typically
forgotten counter-memory is still remembered today.
Few people have forgotten the Vietnam War. This war marked a time period in
American history characterized by conflict and disunity. Contradictions within American society
emerged, creating a unique blend of support and disdain. Many of these differences were rooted
in the alternative sensory stimuli that soldiers and the public experienced. The senses of the
Vietnam War fashioned a particular collective memory, creating a desire to ignore a war that
could not be forgotten. In the aftermath, veterans suffered mental and emotional disabilities
thanks to the blend of traumatic memories and sensory experiences they endured. However, the
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Ken Burns and Lynn Novak, The Vietnam War, directed by Ken Burns and Lynn Novak, 2017 (Walpole, NH:
Florentine Films, 2017, on PBS), Web.

contradictions that were so prominent during this time period led to different collective
memories. These alternate memories originate from major events like the Korean War and the
My Lai Massacre.
The collective memory of the Korean War is one of a forgotten war, leading to a unique
effect on the memory of the Vietnam War because lessons were seemingly elapsed, in the sense
that many of the mistakes made in the former conflict were repeated in the latter one.
Comparing the Korean War in relation to the senses and memory demonstrates how there was a
fragmentation in the collective memory of the Vietnam War. The collective memory of the
Korean War remained primarily intact because most simply wanted to forget it. They were
relatively successful in doing so since the national narrative does not emphasize the Korean War.
The same cannot be said of the Vietnam War.
Within the Vietnam conflict, the My Lai Massacre marks a transition within the
collective memory of the war turning to an unjust war. Different demographics, particularly
among Anglo-Americans and African-Americans, maintain divided memories as a result of
different racial experiences. In simple terms, contradictions and alternative sensory experiences
have created a split in the shared memory of the Vietnam War. This divergence is apparent in
various letters, memoirs, and oral histories by the soldiers themselves. The scholarship created
by various historians concerning this topic also reveals the same kind of occurrence among the
public. All of these factors contribute to a collective memory of the Vietnam veteran plagued
more by mental handicaps than previous veterans, which is not true. Nonetheless, the perception
remains.
Structure
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This thesis is divided into four chapters: 1) Korea and the Forgotten War, 2) Vietnam
Remembered, 3) Imagery and the Media, and 4) Split Senses. The first chapter relates to the
memory of the Korean War and how it connects to the Vietnam War. While labeled the
Forgotten War, this is a misleading name because the Korean War ironically lives on in the
American collective memory. This memory has greatly affected how the Vietnam War is
remembered. Despite its similarities, the Korean War does not have diverging collective
memories like the Vietnam War. The second chapter focuses mainly on how the Vietnam War is
remembered. Key events in memory include the Tet Offensive and the My Lai Massacre. These
events caused the American public (especially white citizens) to question their own perspectives
of the war, leading to conflict within their memories. Out of this conflict, the collective memory
of the war has split. Chapter three details the various imagery that has affected how Vietnam has
been remembered during and after the war. Media outlets created much of this imagery, which
has stuck in the American collective memory for decades. Entertainment modalities, especially
television, initiated this imagery. The final chapter focuses more on senses and how they affect
memory. An argument is made that African-Americans sensed the Vietnam War and homelife
differently thanks to a political discussion of race in the Civil Rights Movement. This alternate
interpretation of senses has led to yet another divergence in the collective memory of the
Vietnam War. The conclusion makes a connection between the Vietnam War and the memory of
the modern-day conflict in the Middle East. Soldiers in particular share similar memories,
suggesting that the conflict in the Middle East will be remembered in a similar fashion to that of
the Vietnam War: split. By examining how the Korean War has collectively been forgotten, the
American population (both citizens and soldiers) interpreted and remembered Vietnam, the
media influenced memory during the Vietnam era and has preserved memory into today, and
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how different demographics interpreted their senses, it is clear that the collective memory of
Vietnam is warped due to alternative memories. The rest of the introduction focuses on
collective memory, sensory history, mental trauma, the warrior image, and the Korean and
Vietnam Wars in a broad sense, thus providing necessary background information concerning
these topics.
Framework for Collective Memory and History
Collective memory is a common theme mentioned throughout; therefore, an intellectual
framework should be briefly established before more is discussed. Peter Burke referred to
collective memory as social memory. He noted, “Given the fact that social memory, like the
individual memory, is selective, we need to identify the principles of selection and to note how
they vary from place to place or from one group to another and how they change over time.” 2
Burke acknowledged the importance of figuring out who alters memories and what were their
motives for doing so. Furthermore, cultures have contrasting memories of historical events due
to how they view the past. In many ways, this phenomenon can be attributed to the idea that the
victors write history, but they also choose what to forget. In this way, the victors shape the
remembrance and forgetting of history. The losers, on the other hand, maintain their version of
events because they are unwilling to accept the narrative that the victors portray. Clearly, this
can lead to contrasting memories of the past, sparked by censorship of potentially embarrassing
actions taken by the victors. It is no secret that minority groups such as African-Americans,
Asian-Americans, and women fit into the category of people who maintain counter-memories.3
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Peter Burke, The Collective Memory Reader, Edited by Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel
Levy, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 189.
3
Burke, 189-191.
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Another scholar, Allan Megill, argues that memory is closely associated with identity.
When a group’s identity is firmly established, memory loses importance. Naturally, when a
group’s identity is unclear, memory becomes vital to defining that group. When identity is
already established, the group creates the past to match that identity; however, when identity is
insecure, memory and identity must be created to align with each other, which essentially means
the group creates an imagined identity and memory. It should be noted that every group has at
least some elements of imagined identity. Megill noted that memory of the past is connected to
experiences of the present. In other words, a group’s present influences how they connect with
and remember their past. Groups of people attempt to define their identity by remembering the
past from a present viewpoint. They may ask themselves, “what past events led to who I am
today?” History acts as a tool to demand truth, occasionally contradicting memory because it
asks for proof. Unfortunately, this proof sometimes no longer exists, meaning people of the
present struggle remembering and interpreting history as it really was. Some of history must be
left to interpretation due to the obscurity of memory. 4
Framework for Sensory History
Much like how collective memory is a key element of this thesis, sensory history is
another. Mark M. Smith provides excellent background information in his book Sensing the
Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in History. Sensory history is a
relatively new area of historical thinking and research. It is not a clearly developed category of
historical thinking like postmodernism or feminism; however, that does not mean there is no
framework to base research around it. With it being in the early stages of intellectual
development, sensory history has the potential to be applicable to all facets of history, whether
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that be political, economic, and/or social. For now, it remains largely focused on cultural
history.
Smith details how the senses were perceived from antiquity to the modern age and argues
that senses and how they are perceived is relative to both the time period and the culture. In this
way, senses are truly a historical topic, in and of themselves. People understand the world
around them through their senses, which affects how they interact with their environment and
others whom they interact with. Smith asserts, “… the senses are not universal, are not
transhistorical, and can only be understood in their specific social and historical contexts.” 5 This
is vital information when considering the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
People interpret senses in a plethora of ways, thus allowing sensory history to typically
be written broadly; however, it can occasionally be used to explain history as well. In general,
the emphasis of sight is considered the turning point in history to the modern age. Sensory
historians usually reject this notion by emphasizing all senses can be characterized by the
modern age. Still, historically senses have been neglected, especially compared to political and
economic history; therefore, development still needs to occur so it does not continue to be
neglected. Fortunately, a select few number of historians changed this trend quite recently. In
the past and still somewhat in the present, sensory historians accepted that the invention of the
printing press spurred on the age of reason, thus making vision the most important sense. This
argument was used to explain cultural differences in which societies with more emphasis on
reason and reading became more individualistic, whereas societies that relied on communicating
information more orally became more communal. While sensory historians accept this to be
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partially true, some challenge that notion. It is unclear where these historical arguments will
lead, which further proves that more sensory research is needed.6
Despite a need to further develop sensory history, many historians of this category argue
certain points in history experience particular senses being more valued than others based on
survival needs and available technology. For example, the inventions of the radio and television
increased the value of hearing and touch. The inventions combined the need of multiple senses,
which affected how societies interacted with the world. Still, by emphasizing some senses over
others, people (especially elites) created distinctions between themselves and others, seemingly
justifying their superiority. This is just one of many reasons why understanding senses must be
done in relation to culture and time.7
As Smith acknowledges, since sensory history is still developing, it is difficult to
understand it and what it means in a larger context of history. 8 While the information given in
this thesis does involve sensory history to a certain degree, much more research is needed due to
the infancy of sensory history. Hopefully, the information provided acts as a foundation for
further research regarding the topic concerned. The difficulty with sensory history (and history
in general) is that people in the present tend struggle comprehending how people in the past
viewed their world. People in the present rely on the gift of hindsight and fall into the trap of
bias towards their own understanding of their present world. Historians must cast aside this bias
to better understand the ways of the past. To do this perfectly is impossible, but historians must
still make the attempt.
Mental Trauma
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Smith, 4-5, 8-9.
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John Musgrave commented concerning fighting in the dark, “That’s real scary stuff. I’m
scared of the dark still. I still got a nightlight. When my kids were growing up, that’s the first
time they really found out that Daddy had been in a war, when they said, ‘Why do we need to
outgrow our night lights? Daddy still got one.’”9 The absence of the visual sense plagued
Musgrave’s mind even after he has returned from the war. These fears remain in the collective
memory because the image of a traumatized veteran is still remembered, all thanks to the loss of
using one’s visual sense.
Vietnam veterans face many mental scars, which highlights the intense sensory
experiences they lived through. Most people remember mentally disturbed veterans when they
think about the Vietnam War. While this paper does not focus as much on this topic since much
of the information connects to psychology, a brief overview is necessary in the introduction to
portray a more complete picture of sensory experiences that connect to collective memory.
Before these disorders are more thoroughly examined, information concerning mental trauma in
general must first be acknowledged. Mental disorders occur due to a combination of biological
and sociocultural conditions. In other words, a person’s increased biological likelihood as well
as the social and cultural elements of the society he/she lives in will determine the odds of
someone developing a mental disorder.10
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the most commonly referred to mental disorder
when discussing mental trauma, particularly among Vietnam veterans. While not all mentally
traumatized Vietnam veterans have PTSD, understanding the components of the condition is
beneficial to comprehending how mental disorders can be obtained. People develop PTSD
through four factors: 1) external trauma occurs that is too much for a person to mentally cope, 2)
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Ken Burns and Lynn Novak, The Vietnam War.
Allan V. Horwitz, PTSD: A Short History, (Johns Hopkins Biographies of Disease, 2018), xiii.
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present events trigger the past event to make it seem like the event is happening in the present, 3)
symptoms of stress become related to the person’s active memory of the event, and 4) the term
“disorder” indicates the condition does not dissipate quickly over time. It should be noted that
PTSD is difficult to distinguish from other conditions since people with PTSD suffer with other
mental stressors as well. For example, up to 80% of people with PTSD also experience anxiety
and depression. For this reason, the author explores mental disorders in general instead of
focusing solely on PTSD. Oftentimes, the mind represses and forgets memories from stressful,
traumatic events. It is not until the memory is triggered by a similar sensory experience that the
memory is recalled. Repression partially explains why the Korean War is considered forgotten.
It is also possible that earlier events in life can cause an increased likelihood of obtaining a
mental disorder like PTSD. As Christian G. Appy suggests and will later be described in more
detail, most Vietnam soldiers came from the working class, and they lived more likely in poverty
and alcohol-abusive homes. Nonetheless, the rate of mental disorders among Vietnam veterans
is similar to previous wars due to mutual support amongst themselves and their willingness to
talk about their experiences.11
Prisoners of War (POWs) developed PTSD and other mental disorders more often than
non-POW’s during the Vietnam War. POW’s exemplify the impossibility of measuring stress
because people handle events differently within their own mental capacity. Two people with
alternate means of handling stress most likely will react in completely different ways despite
experiencing similar events. James F.T. Corcoran conducted a psychological study among Air
Force POW’s, which showed the effect incarceration can have on the mental status of an
individual. Corcoran suggests a correlation between mortality rates and the average length of
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time spent as a POW and PTSD. The mortality rate of Korean POW’s was 38% compared to 5%
in North Vietnam. The average length of time spent as a POW in Korea was 2.02 years
compared to 6.0 years in North Vietnam prior to 1969 and only 0.6 years after. He used the term
“North Vietnam” because during the Vietnam War, the United States allied with southern
Vietnam, so naturally the South Vietnamese army lacked American POW’s. Among Vietnam
veterans, soldiers who fought before 1969 experienced a higher risk of psychiatric diagnosis than
those who served after. Corcoran also argues mental instability in general among POW’s
increased significantly compared to soldiers who successfully avoided imprisonment. On the
other hand, formal education may prevent PTSD from occurring due to observations of less
instances in Air Force Repatriated Prisoner’s of War (RPW’s). These men were mostly officers
who had higher levels of formal education than the typical Vietnam soldier. Despite these
findings, Corcoran concludes that predicting how someone reacts mentally to extreme stress is
nearly impossible.12
Corcoran’s findings suggest extreme sensory stimulation can affect the likelihood of
PTSD and other mental disorders because POW’s tend to experience higher levels of sensory
stimulation compared to soldiers who avoid capture. For example, POW’s experience torture,
headaches, disease including dysentery, hunger, and dehydration at an increased rate compared
to non-POW’s, which applies to the sense of touch. Again, the argument that formal education
may prevent PTSD connects to Appy’s argument that Vietnam soldiers were mostly workingclass citizens. This indicates that most Vietnam soldiers experienced a higher risk of PTSD
based on their class since working-class citizens typically lack a higher formal education

James F.T. Corcoran, “The Concentration Camp Syndrome and USAF Vietnam Prisoners of War”, Nursing &
Allied Health Database, Psychiatric Annals; Nov. 1982, 991-994.
12
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compared to middle and upper class citizens. The fact Vietnam veterans coped just as well if not
better than Korean War veterans is shown by examining the experience of Korean War POW’s
after they returned home and the collective memory of the Korean War.
The Warrior Image
A reoccurring theme throughout this study concerns the warrior image, which Andrew J.
Huebner exquisitely details in his book The Warrior Image: Soldiers in American Culture from
the Second World War to the Vietnam Era. Huebner argues that people challenged the warrior
image of an American soldier depicted as a glorified and hardened individual in World War II,
the Korean War, and most prominently in the Vietnam War. He notes that the warrior image has
been around since ancient times; however, in American history, the masses widely accepted this
glorified image. It was not until World War II, when censoring the media lessened, that this
image changed. With less censorship, the media reached a mass audience, which ultimately
altered that image. Undoubtedly, this changing image is one of the lead causes for the splits in
collective memory of the Vietnam War. Huebner argues all three wars impacted this change of
the warrior image. World War II started the questioning, the Korean War acted as a transition
event, and the Vietnam War officially changed the warrior image to a less romanticized and
sentimental one. This paper somewhat challenges that notion by arguing some still romanticized
the warrior while others did not. This argument is based on the split in collective memory.
However, Huebner adequately shows how the warrior image changes from a romantic one in
World War II to one of victimization in Vietnam. This victimized warrior image helped the
public better understand the travesty of war. In fact, the ultimate cost of war is now firmly
associated in the warrior image as a result of the gradual change from 1940-1970.13
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While this thesis does not cover the collective memory or sensory experience of World
War II for the sake of brevity, the effect from World War II on the warrior image should be
briefly described to better comprehend the warrior image in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
World War II did not accomplish the change of the warrior image to one of pity. However, it
created a desire by the masses to know more about the “raw experience” of war. The media
portrayed the valiant soldier who overcomes adversity. Nonetheless, some images contradicted
this view, peaking the public’s curiosity. After the war in the late 1940’s, more images were
given to the public that contradicted with their idea of a World War II soldier. After the war,
World War II veterans vocalized the way the government and media portrayed the war (as a
patriotic, justified war) compared to how the soldiers actually experienced it (as one of suffering
and death). Despite the growth of a negative portrayal of the World War II soldier’s experience,
most people perceived the warrior image in a positive light. Still, this marked the beginning of
the transitioning warrior image. This transformation will be more thoroughly examined
throughout the rest of this paper.14
Overview of the Korean and Vietnam Wars
Now that the collective memory related to mental disorders and the connecting theme of
a warrior image has been described, the collective memory of the war in general must be
explored. A description of the Korean War must be examined in order to better understand the
memory of the Vietnam War. In order to do so, brief histories of the wars themselves also need
to be acknowledged.
Initially to enforce their foreign policy of containment, the United States began
interacting with Korea and Vietnam. The government attempted to contain communism through
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this policy, especially after China became communistic in 1949. This reasoning stuck within the
American collective memory and helped the American public and soldiers justify their actions in
Korea and Vietnam. Containment, developed by George Kennan, in Korea and Vietnam was a
result of the larger international picture of communism as a whole. The United States population
and government feared communism, which explains why the United States involved itself
militarily in both countries. This begs the question of the worth of involvement in Korea and
Vietnam. According to many soldiers and public polls, they viewed the conflict as unworthy of
their resources, time, and soldiers.15 Americans also grew fearful from the domino theory.
Originating during the Korean War, the domino theory stated that after one country fell to
communism, the rest would follow. Americans viewed Vietnam as the key domino following
the Korean War to prevent the rest of East Asia from falling. People feared the fall of Vietnam
even more after France lost its hold as a colonizer. Southeast Asia seemingly overflowed with
resources, so the theory argued western countries would fall to communism as a result of
dependence on those resources.16
At first, the American public in general supported the decision to wage war in Korea
because people saw it as the right step to fight for democracy and freedom against communism.
Policy makers also supported the decision at first because they still remembered the failed policy
of appeasement from World War II. They wanted to show the world that the U.S. would lead the
fight against communism. Most of the population recalled the reasons to fight in WWII and
viewed Korea in a similar way. New outlets heavily influenced the popular opinion of the war
The news outlets typically agreed with President Harry Truman’s narrative: North Korea was
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evil. The agreement between the president and the media is a key difference between Korea and
Vietnam.17
President Truman wanted to only fight a limited war while his top general in Korea,
General Douglas MacArthur, wanted to fight total warfare. Most felt similarly as Truman, but
the memory of appeasement remained in the forefront of people’s memory who opposed him.
The last two years of the war saw no major attacks. Any advancements made on either side were
to benefit negotiation purposes. Unfortunately, negotiations rarely succeeded due to superiority
complexes on both sides that caused negotiations to stalemate and fighting to continue. Limited
war meant the impossibility of total war, which upset Americans later in the war since the war
seemed to drag on. No clear victories and the deaths of soldiers resulted in less support for the
war and President Truman.18
Many Korean and Vietnam soldiers believed the native allies were inferior to the native
enemies. In Korea, this can be explained due to class. The South Korean army’s consisted of
organization based on class, not skill. The officers came from the higher class, and the common
soldiers consisted of mostly peasants with minimal military training. The North, however,
organized based on skill. A similar situation occurred in Vietnam. In both wars, the difference
of skills on both sides confounded American soldiers. Typically, stronger communist forces,
such as the Soviet Union and China, trained and supplied their counterparts in Korea and
Vietnam. This support explains the vast military differences between the communist and
democratic forces in the two countries. The U.S. forces saw the democratic forces as an ally, yet
also dependent on U.S. aid. Without the military training and more constant supply of war
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resources that their opponents enjoyed, the democratic forces in Korea and Vietnam were
severely outgunned and outmaneuvered. 19
An important element of the Korean War was that it was the first to have desegregated
military divisions. This did not fully occur until the end of the war, and at the beginning
segregation still existed. Truman needed more black votes, and he believed integration was
needed for the military to be at full strength. African-American soldiers in Vietnam faced a
different narrative because the military implemented integration during the entire war.
Segregation and the abolishment thereof played a key role in the visual sense of the war. Based
on the color of one’s skin, racism impacted the relationships between soldiers and the civilian
populations.20
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Chapter 1: Korea and the Forgotten War
The “Forgotten” Korean War
Forgetting is the key connection between the Korean and Vietnam War. With so many
similarities and the ultimate distaste of the Korean War amongst the public, people truly consider
the war forgotten, but not in its entirety. Otherwise, the American public, politicians, and
presidents likely would not have engaged in another similar war in Vietnam. To highlight this
point, a similar event in the Korean War to the My Lai Massacre should be explained. In the
summer of 1950, the South Korean leader and U.S. ally, Syngman Rhee, committed acts of terror
on his own people, killing approximately fifty thousand Koreans in the process. The U.S. news
outlets never reported on this, exemplifying the contrasting role the media played in Korea and
Vietnam. For example, the My Lai Massacre media coverage acted against the U.S. government.
The differing media coverage greatly impacted the collective memory of both wars. 21
Historians label the Korean War as “forgotten” since so many in the U.S. preferred to
forget it ever happened. Why? The U.S. failed to obtain victory, despite facing a militarily
inferior North Korea. This disremembering is why an almost identical war followed in Vietnam.
Both saw villages burned, the U.S. struggled against guerilla warfare, unpopularity among
citizens and soldiers, the belief that the military failed in its performance due to politicians
holding it back, and the difficulty for American forces to distinguish between enemies and
civilians. However, many historians consider the failure of the U.S. to use its military
advantages and translate them into victory as the most resounding similarity between Korea and
Vietnam.22 As Keene acknowledges, the Korean War evolved in the collective memory of
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“‘being unnoticed’ to that of a ‘troubling absence’ finally to become a ‘significant omission’”. 23
The fact the creation of the Vietnam War Memorial (1982) occurred before the Korean War
Memorial (1995) furthers this point.
Others historians further explain why the U.S. failed in Korea. Ernst K. Isensee argues
some of the blame falls on poorly trained U.S. ground forces not ready for combat in 1950. This
unpreparedness stemmed from the post-WWII belief that the U.S. could deter Soviet and
Communist influence by threatening nuclear attack. Through this belief, the army received less
funding, and social and economic programs benefitted more. With less money, troops
demobilized and returned to civilian life. To make matters worse, trainers neglected adequate
giving adequate training to new soldiers. Isensee defines these neglected soldiers as civilian
soldiers because they were “mentally, morally, and physically unfit for combat…” 24 This
physical unreadiness gave the Chinese and Korean communists an advantage. For example, U.S.
soldiers relied on transportation via truck to reach their destinations (as opposed to marching).
However, mountainous terrain riddles the country of Korea meaning few roads existed. The
roads were usually located in the low ground, giving an advantage to the enemy because they
maintained the high ground in almost every scenario. A similar situation arose with Vietnam
soldiers who struggled adapting to the unconventional environment that they fought in. A major
difference between the two in this case is a lock of political conversation over this issue for
Korean War veterans.25
The collective memory of Americans generally accepts that the U.S. failed in Korea due
to unpreparedness. Since most accept this idea, the Korean War collective memory lacks a
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significant division. With no serious political/social conversations like those that occurred
during the Vietnam War in the form of the Civil Rights Movement and the large-scale protests
made by the veterans themselves, the dominant white memory of the Korean War remains intact.
Also, the lack of visual sensory stimuli through television did not stir up the population enough.
All of these factors were present in the Vietnam War, creating splits in memory due to the
varying narratives originating at the same time. It is important to note that Isensee compared
Korean soldiers to World War II soldiers throughout his report.26
Keene indicates three reasons on why the collective memory forgot the Korean War: 1)
clear timelines of the beginning and end of the war fail to be acknowledge, 2) no glorified
battlefields presently exist where memory can be attributed (like Gettysburg in the U.S.), and 3)
people fail to recognize definitive imagery of the soldier who fought in it (like the connection of
trench warfare with the WWI soldier). The first two reasons can adequately explain the
forgetting of the Korean War; however, the Korean soldier as a POW is present within the
American mindset, thus making the third reason inapplicable. The American collective memory
remembers the image of a soldier who was defeated and brainwashed by communism. Some
veterans forget because remembering may be too painful for those who fought in it due to
feelings of shame and humiliation. This encouraged many to desire to forget the war, which the
U.S. government embraced.27
Other remnants in the collective memory of the Korean War remain, despite a desire to
forget. Again, most people remember the Korean soldier typically labeled as soft. News reports
of soldiers fleeing from battle and the lack of a quick victory reinforced this idea. Memories of
WWII and the defeat of Japan and Germany seemed to contrast with the inability to defeat North
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Korea, a much weaker and less advanced country. People applied these same thoughts to
Vietnam soldiers.28
In addition to the Korean soldier remaining in memory, the memory of the Korean War
as a police action remains. People share the memory of the U.S. acting to benefit freedom
globally and to suppress the evils of communism. This explains the memory of the war as a
police action because people believed the U.S. fought against an illegal force of communism due
to its evil ways of totalitarianism. This undoubtedly carried over to Vietnam, which attributed to
the contradictions people experienced mentally when they found out the reality of the war.29
Mental Trauma Among Korean War Soldiers
Perhaps the most prominent image maintained in the collective memory of the Korean
War is that of Prisoners of War (POW). When it comes to collective memory, people only
remember the POW in many cases. POW’s in Korea had the highest death rate of any U.S. war,
and none escaped prison. Back home, people believed POW’s in Korea were weaker (compared
to WWI and WWII POW’s), seeing this as a sign of diminished U.S. soldier integrity. The same
line of thinking occurred towards Vietnam soldiers. This did not occur due to less integrity, as
sociologists in the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s proved, rather the image remained due to the
failure of the U.S. to win.30 Of the 7,140 Americans who were POW’s of the Korean War, half
died while being prisoners. Judith Keene writes in an article concerning the Korean War that the
POW was the “antithesis of the fighting man”.31 This image of a weak, dependent soldier
contradicts with what the public expected a soldier to be. Soldiers could escape this image only
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by escaping. Escaping became a key image of POW’s in popular culture like literature and
movies. However, the Korean POW faced nearly impossible circumstances to fulfill this image
of escapee. Korean POW’s faced another false image of a traitor and communist sympathizer.
While many collaborated for various reasons (possibly as much as 70%), most did so against
their will. The public saw it as a weakness of the U.S. Korean veterans in general. This was a
stereotype since only twenty-one soldiers chose not to return to the U.S. after the war. They
decided to live in communist China. Those who defected made up an extreme minority, still, the
image stuck.32
Since some suspected Korean POW’s as Communist sympathizers and collaborators, the
FBI interviewed the Korean War veterans about personal experiences in their encampment.
Most resented the questioning because it forced them to remember what they would rather
forget. The FBI even looked into their families, causing those families to feel uneasy because
severe consequences awaited those who helped the enemy. FBI investigations even affected
veterans not suspected of collaboration, sometimes for years. One such veteran was Richard
Bassett. Since the general suspicion towards Korean POW’s was so prominent, he refrained
from talking about experiences and repressed his memories. This led to him developing PTSD in
1978 after having a nervous breakdown. Clearly, doctors and psychiatrists did not adequately
treat him well after the war, so he could cope with his actions in Korea. Bassett’s story indicates
a desire and willingness to forget the Korean War as a whole by society. This ultimately led to
more severe cases of mental disorders among Korean veterans compared to Vietnam veterans
due to their inability to talk about their traumatic experiences.33
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The collective memory of the Korean War can be found in the explanations given for
Korean POW’s actions: 1) they were brainwashed by Communistic countries and 2) the national
will was weakening, which meant society failed to train the youth as Americans. These ideas
and memories transferred themselves to the Vietnam War, implanting in the collective memory
of that conflict instead of the Korean War itself. After all, the American collective memory
forgot the Korean War, even though individuals still retain memories of the event.34 Even
though the memory is no longer remembered collectively, it has impacted Vietnam veteran’s
sensory experiences as well as the collective memory of the Vietnam War.
Warrior Image During the Korean War
The Korean War marked the transition of the warrior image between World War II and
the Vietnam War. General MacArthur’s advocation for as free of a press as possible changed the
warrior image during the Korean War. The responsibility of censorship fell on the journalists (as
opposed to the government). MacArthur believed a thriving democracy needed a free press. At
first, the free press painted the war in a positive light. This changed as the journalists began to
witness more negative experiences of the combat soldier. The journalists visibly saw the soldiers
suffering from fatigue and sorrow. Pictures of Korean War soldiers sleeping started popping up
in many American news outlets. These images showed U.S. soldiers as susceptible to weakness
and incapable of invincibility. Soldiers grew weary during the first stage of the conflict because
they frequently retreated with little to no sleep.35
Journalists created an image of sorrow as an early negative theme of the Korean War
warrior image. Many journalists wrote about the sad conditions that soldiers faced. At the start
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of the war, the Korean force greatly outnumbered and outmaneuvered American forces, resulting
in heavy casualties. One notable story of sorrow mentioned in Huebner’s book includes a
lieutenant who reluctantly abandoned wounded soldiers unable to walk. He gave them grenades
because it was seemingly the only thing he could do for them. The Lieutenant meant for the
wounded men to use the grenades on themselves, so they could commit suicide and avoid
becoming a prisoner of war. Another story involves a soldier who angrily questioned a journalist
if they (the media) told the truth back home about the overwhelming amount of death that they
faced. The soldier asked, “Are you telling them that we have nothing to fight with, and that it is
an utterly useless war?”36 Obviously sorrowful stories like these contradicted the positive view
Americans back home envisioned of the soldier’s experience. An increased free press acted as
the tipping off point for stronger opposition to the war. Interestingly, when MacArthur launched
his successful counter-attack, these negative images and concerns faded, but the concerns
returned eventually.37
The media outlets often portrayed the warrior image in contradicting ways during the
Korean War. For example, one could easily experience a news reel depicting images of
wounded and dying soldiers while awkwardly upbeat music played alongside the pictures. This
contradiction epitomizes how the Korean War was a transitional event for the warrior image.
The image of the war maintained neither a positive nor negative memory. Obviously, this
portrayal would be confusing to the American collective memory, which may explain why
people tend to forget the Korean War more easily. People typically forget what they do not
understand, instead of trying to comprehend information that seemingly makes little sense.
Korean veterans struggled with the forgetfulness of the American population. The failure to

36
37

Huebner, 101.
Huebner, 101, 107.

22

remember the Korean War veterans’ tribulations meant veterans felt like their experiences and
sufferings lacked validation.38
Journalists’ portrayals of a suffering Korean War soldier made the U.S. populace view
the Korean War veterans as victims of the U.S. government, something that never occurred
before (at least on a large scale). This similar victimization reoccurred in the public’s response
to the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War, which is described later. Still, this
victimization failed to change the hero status of the soldiers. That would not change until
Vietnam. In contrast to victimization, U.S. citizens supported the war more often if constantly
reminded of the Communist threat. For those who failed to be reminded, they more likely
viewed U.S. involvement in Korea negatively. Again, this shows a split in memory. Those
reminded of communistic threats typically viewed the war more positively and vice versa. 39
African-American Warrior Image in Korea
At the start of the Korean War, the military still segregated blacks and whites.
Eventually, President Truman signed an executive order to desegregate the military; however,
the military slowly implemented this order. As a result, the Army maintained segregation. At
first the American public, including whites, viewed the African-American warrior image in a
positive way since media outlets praised the all-black regiments. This made the NAACP
suspicious because positive portrayals of African-Americans in the media in the 1950’s rarely
occurred. In response, the NAACP argued the media outlets supported the idea of continued
segregation abroad and at home through this positive portrayal. After the NAACP revealed this
to be true, the media outlets portrayed African-American regiments more negatively, and blamed
them for losses. Interestingly, this encouraged desegregation because people back home began
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to believe African-Americans performed better alongside whites, who led better by example.
With integration more commonplace, African-American soldiers integrated themselves into the
warrior image because photographers pictured them alongside whites. Unfortunately, this
increased media attention of African-Americans in combat can be attributed to more AfricanAmericans being sent to the frontlines, where death occurred more often.40
Military personnel and many of the public viewed integration in the army in Korea as a
military necessity, rather than a social one. White people saw segregation as detrimental to the
military, not necessarily society. One African-American captain said, “The trouble is, you take a
man who in his own country has always been treated as a second-class citizen, and you call upon
him to fight as a first-class soldier. You talk to him about democracy, and liberty, and how these
things are worth fighting for. But the words don’t mean the same to him as they mean to a white
soldier who has always been free.”41 This contradiction occurred in both Korea and Vietnam. In
both wars, the contradiction angered African-American soldiers; however, African-Americans
became more active in the fight back home during the Vietnam War, not the Korean. AfricanAmericans collectively remember the Vietnam War more than the Korean War because it
coincided with the Civil Rights Movement. African-Americans and whites alike associate
equality and civil rights with the Vietnam War, which are things African-Americans struggled to
attain for centuries. The Korean War lacked this connection. African-Americans rarely
challenged racism in the Korean War era (with the exception of Thurgood Marshall and the
NAACP). The lack of challenge against racism explains why the split in African-American
memory occurred in the Vietnam War, since it coincided with the Civil Rights Movement. 42

40

Huebner, 110-113.
Huebner, 118.
42
Huebner, 118.
41

24

Propaganda and Psychological Warfare in the Korean War Era
In a report created by various members of the Eighth Army, they explained how they
created and implemented psychological warfare during the Korean War. Unfortunately, the
names of those who wrote the report were blacked out, so they cannot be attributed for their
writings. The purpose for analyzing the psychological warfare used is to point out that despite
similar circumstances between Korea and Vietnam, the collective memory remembers the wars
in much different terms. Also, psychological warfare demonstrates a clear connection to the
senses. The members of the Eighth Army made the report to inform future generations of the
practices used. The stated reason of the psychological warfare itself was to be, “A. Against the
enemy, to lower his fighting ability and cause surrender. B. Against the populace in enemy-held
areas, to cause the people to turn on the enemy troops.” 43 This indicates psyops (the people
conducting psychological warfare) targeted both soldiers and civilians in their operations.
Psyops also did not automatically assume citizens to be on either the American’s or North
Korean’s side in the war, which means they did not see the U.S. as a savior. In other words,
Korean civilians did not see the U.S. as a country to save them from communism.44
The Eighth Army used printed leaflets that they airdropped on the enemy and civilians in
enemy territory as their means of conducting psychological warfare. They also installed
loudspeakers so messages could be relayed to those populations. In this way, they clearly
targeted the sensory experiences of the enemy. They initially used Chinese linguists to help
translate their messages. This reveals a clear disconnect between cultures because they lacked
anyone in their whole ranks to accomplish the task of translation. They found it even harder to
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find Korean linguists. Since there were less to choose from, they paid Korean linguists higher
wages and better benefits. The psyops trained the linguists to interrogate POW’s to gain
information necessary to improve the messages delivered via leaflets and loudspeakers. In most
cases, the POW’s cooperated, and the interviews took about 1-1 ½ days to complete. To create a
friendly environment to encourage the POW’s to speak, the interviewers gave the POW’s small
gifts, such as cigarettes and candy. The use of taste played an important role in extracting
information used in psychological warfare. The interrogators questioned (through a
questionnaire) POW’s on their exposure to leaflets and loudspeakers to determine if
psychological warfare influenced their opinions. They were even asked to criticize the leaflets,
in terms of size, color, text, and artwork. Clearly, psyops heavily appealed to the sense to
conduct their mission.45
Psyops also collected and interpreted enemy messages and leaflets that the enemy used
for the same purposes as U.S. leaflets. However, enemy leaflet messages occurred so
infrequently that psyops did not view the leaflets as worthy of investigation. They obtained an
abundance of enemy loudspeaker messages though. A report of enemy loudspeaker messages in
May 1953 indicated 66% were in Korean, 22% in English, and 12% were musical. Out of these
messages, 56% of the understood messages included taunts/threats and 44% advocated for a U.S.
surrender. Surprisingly, only about 16% displayed anti-U.S. or anti-U.N. messages. Soldiers
from every corner of the war heard these messages frequently. The messages occurred so often,
the soldiers likely learned to ignore them.46
At first, psychological warfare failed due to a misunderstanding of the culture. The
sensory stimuli of wrong images, colors, and symbols failed to resonate among the Korean
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citizens. American forces clearly misunderstood Korean culture. Eventually, a recommendation
was made to improve psychological warfare by studying the culture itself to make the messages
more culturally relevant. Theoretically, psyops could use the information to better the
propaganda effort. These studies likely played an important role in leaflet design. By utilizing
cultural information, psyops and American forces made the leaflets more appealing to the
intended targets visually, contextually, and culturally due to the cultural relevance and
identifiable symbols. Another suggestion for improvement was to provide funds for cigarettes
and candy used during interrogation processes since the interrogators themselves often used their
own money to purchase these products. This idea appealed to the sense of taste (and possibly
smell) to improve interrogation effectiveness. Psyops appeased to the culture by connecting with
the senses of sight, taste, and smell. Psyops created a collective memory that the Americans
misunderstood Korean culture based off of their failure to initially connect to the population via
sensory experiences concerning loudspeakers and leaflets.47
A problem the psyops experienced involved their translators because they used too
formal of language since most earned a college education. This made the average Korean citizen
and soldier (who was not college-educated) incapable of understanding the messages transferred
to them, effectively making the messages worthless. They eventually decided to simplify the
messages. Simplified messages meant more effectiveness and a better connection to the culture.
Still, the psyops original disconnect of connecting through the senses reinforced the memory that
the two cultures misunderstood each other.48
For loudspeakers, music was used to grab the listener’s attention before the actual
message was given. Between July 1951-July 1952, psyops recorded 184 messages. The report
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claimed that 2,943 POW surrenders resulted from loudspeaker messages. It also claimed that
psychological warfare affected 74% of POW’s. For leaflets, psyops created about 711 leaflet
designs throughout the entirety of the war. At first, these leaflets were ineffective, but they
improved as the war went on and psyops gathered more information. Through the POW
questionnaire, POW’s critiqued and improved the leaflets. The information gave the psyops a
better representation of “enemy weapons, uniforms, life, and customs. Much use of color was
essential as it increased the appeal of leaflets to the Oriental.” 49
They also discovered that Koreans hardly ever recognized western accepted symbols.
The Korean population in general failed to recognize the hammer and sickle symbol commonly
associated with the Soviet Union and communism. Most Koreans did not understand
communism as the U.S. did: a threat spreading from the Soviet Union. This indicates Americans
based their fear on the spread of communism inaccurately by not relying on observable truth
from a cultural standpoint. The U.S. masses failed to recognized this discrepancy, which is a key
reason why the dominant memory remained intact during the Korean War. There was no
definitive division during the Korean War.50
Outside of psychological warfare, the report revealed a similar problem faced by those in
Vietnam: American soldier struggled distinguishing Korean soldiers from the citizens. The
report acknowledged the need to change its message to the South Koreans to move more south
when the U.S. was being pushed back. The new message was a warning not to cross the Hen
River. Anyone crossing the river would be shot due to previous infiltrations by the enemy. The
enemy would dress up in civilian clothing and attack the United States in the rear. The failure of

49
50

“Report on the Psychological Warfare…” 17, 32, 35.
“Report on the Psychological Warfare…” 18.

28

the American soldiers to use their visual sense adequately to identify the enemy contributed to
the collective memory of the enemy being unidentifiable. 51
Overall, this report reveals that the war was highly influenced by the senses; however,
this alone does not mean that the memory was split. Psychological warfare played an important
role in the Korean War when it comes to how people sensed it. The opposing sensory
experiences between Koreans and Americans reveals a cultural disconnection between the two,
which was also seen in Vietnam. Despite this similarity, the dominant white memory remained
relatively whole since no counter-memory adequately managed to challenge it.
In Their Own Words: Korean War Veterans
Besides the collective memory of the Korean War, the recollections of the soldiers show
that they experienced similar sensory experiences of Vietnam soldiers, proving Vietnam
Soldier’s experiences were not necessarily “worse” leading to more instances of mental trauma.
Ernesto F. De Leon fought on the front lines in Korea. His sensory experience highlights the
survival instinct of war. When describing temperatures in Korea and how they could drop to -30
degrees Fahrenheit, he mentioned eating corned beef hash. He absolutely hated that food. He
was once given a moldy, frozen C-ration of corned beef hash. In the trial of war, he ate the
moldy food like a popsicle. While it is easy to understand doing this in war, the experience
reveals the survival mode soldiers must embrace and their willingness to do actions that they
normally would not do. The sensory experience involving taste aligns with the noble and
sacrificing image the dominant white memory held of the American soldier52
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Another testimony by William Y. Smith (an air pilot) indicates the obscurity of war.
Korean enemy fire shot down Smith’s plane during his 97th mission. As a result, he received an
injury, soldiers rescued him, and doctors amputated his foot. Smith experienced the difficulty to
see while bombing due to weather and smoke. Sometimes, he dropped bombs, not knowing
what he hit. Obviously, the loss of a visual target may have resulted in the death of many
innocent lives. Smith failed acknowledge this possibility and seemed to show no regret. Perhaps
the detachment of close combat prevented him from developing guilt. From his perspective, the
only visual sense he had was that of a bomb leaving his plane and creating an explosion. He
missed the sensory experiences that soldiers on the ground likely experienced. Soldiers on the
ground could smell burning flesh and fire, see the mangled bodies caused by Smith’s bombs, and
hear the desperate cries of those blasted to pieces. For these reasons, soldiers on the ground
refrained from speaking about their experiences, while soldiers like Smith, who did not have
nearly as many similar sensory experiences like them, could more easily write about their
actions. For Vietnam veterans, detachment did not seem to have the same effect. The fact an air
pilot is more open to recording his memories and experiences shows the general unwillingness of
Korean War veterans to write about their memories. It also highlights the difficulty in finding
sources written by Korean War veterans who fought on the ground. The writing of memories
often preserves the collective memory. The lack of writing due to sensory experiences means the
war can more easily be forgotten.53
While writing home to his mother, Donald Luedtke complained about the war and argued
the men in power should fight in the war, not people like him. However, hesitated in fully
criticizing the war because it implied a critique of the U.S., a taboo action during a time of war.
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This differs from some Vietnam veterans who openly criticized the war with little to no
hesitation. Luedtke still showed optimism, believing the war would get better. Luedtke’s
attitude, though not universal, demonstrates the beginnings of skepticism towards the U.S.
involvement in East Asia, which will theoretically explode during the Vietnam War.54
Gordon Madson was a POW of the Korean War, and he wrote a letter to his friend’s
father, detailing what life was like as a POW and the fate of his friend, John Wheeler. He
explained that as POW’s their captors fed them twice a day (usually a small ball of rice), and
they only drank water if they marched near a stream. He also explained that they lived in filthy
conditions, with lice and other parasites being a commonality. These conditions got so bad that
Wheeler developed a skin disease. Shortly after falling ill, their captors sent Wheeler to a
hospital; however, Madson later revealed that he found out this hospital was actually a death
house, so he concluded Wheeler probably died there. At the end of the letter, Madson admitted
to a deep hatred towards the Chinese and Koreans, claiming they were all murderers. 55 This
hatred is reminiscent of the hatred felt by Vietnam soldiers towards the Vietnamese. Madson
demonstrates many of the sensory elements Korean POW’s experienced. For taste, their captors
only gave them bland meals of grain. This food was limited, so they also felt the gnawing pain
of hunger. The filthy conditions obviously prevented any feeling of cleanliness. The lice tore
into their skin with microscopic bites causing pain and itchiness. In addition to these conditions,
Madson revealed a racist attitude towards Chinese and Koreans that represents many Korean
War veterans attitudes, not just POW’s. This stemmed from an overload of negative sensory
experiences that he endured. The dramatic sensory experiences Madson endured created racist
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tendencies towards the captors he saw day-in and day-out. Connecting these experiences to
racism, Korean War veterans who experienced similar negative sensory situations blamed them
on the enemy. These sensory experiences created a collective memory that Koreans and other
Asian populations are less human due to the sensory treatment they gave American POW’s
Korea Remembered
While Americans consider the Korean War as the Forgotten War, one should take this
label only a metaphor instead of as literal truth. The collective memory certainly maintains
memories associated with the Korean War, but no counter-memories stand out above the others.
The Korean War Memorial exemplifies this. While it was in the process of being made, it faced
nearly ten years of politicians arguing about how they should represent it. Blacks and whites
integrated for the first time during the Korean War, so they grappled with that concept. It was
also the first U.S. war in modern times that was not clearly won. The politicians making the
memorial had to figure out if they would recognize women and the United Nation’s roles in the
war. Their arguing reveals people interpreted the war in a variety of ways after the fact. Clearly,
people remembered. The fact a memorial exists at all suggests that to be true. However, the
memory is not split like Vietnam because the American collective memory clearly defined the
Korean War narrative as being unimportant. Conversely, the Vietnam War had different
memories as its origins, which explains for the split memory. 56
Ironically, by labeling the Korean War as “forgotten,” Americans remembered it. A
major reason for viewing it as forgotten attributes to it largely being out of the public sphere.
When the war settled around the 38th parallel, with little change occurring, the public somewhat
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lost interest and resumed their everyday livelihoods and modes of thinking. Korean War
veterans spoke up over the years about feeling overlooked by the U.S. government and
population for their war efforts. They argued the American public’s attention focuses on World
War II and Vietnam veterans. Considering the Vietnam War Memorial was constructed before
the Korean War Memorial, even though American involvement in the Vietnam War occurred
more than a decade after the Korean War ended, Korean War veterans argument justifies their
feelings. Still, The public’s disinterest in the war made the Korean War veterans try to forget
too.57
The reader should find it clear now that American society remembers the Korean War,
but they consider it forgotten because most people wanted to forget it. It is also clear that there
are connections between the Korean and Vietnam War. Due to the eerily similar characteristics
of both wars, historians, politicians, and the general public consistently compare the Vietnam
War to the Korean War. In this way, politicians making American policies for Vietnam linked
their reasoning behind them to the Korean War. The Korean War acted as a guide on how to
conduct the Vietnam War. The problem with that scenario, as many recognize, is that a large
number of people view the Korean War as unsuccessful. It seemed counterintuitive to model the
Vietnam War after a war that many wanted to forget. Politicians (including Presidents Johnson
and Nixon) evidently did not desire to forget the Korean War since they kept America in
Vietnam despite widespread opposition. In fact, they saw the Korean War as a success. This can
partially explain why the government oftentimes miscommunicated with the American public,
sparking the distrust that encapsulated the Vietnam War era. The American public largely saw
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the Korean War as a mistake, but a valuable lesson learned. By getting involved in Vietnam,
government evidently disregarded the lesson entirely.58
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Chapter 2: Vietnam Remembered
A General Connection Between the Korean and Vietnam Wars
The Korean War clearly influenced the Vietnam War in multiple ways. While what has
already been described was more in-depth, a broader explanation of the connections between the
Korean and Vietnam Wars is needed to fully comprehend the collective memory of both wars.
The U.S. resisted communism even more as a result from the Korean War, which culminated
into a mindset that advocated for more prevention of communism spreading. This led to harsher
policies and actions in the Vietnam War. In general, the U.S. public saw the Korean War as an
attempt by the Soviet Union to obtain world domination. This explains why the government
viewed military action as necessary. Additionally, the South Korean government saw
communism similarly to how the U.S. did, which made cooperation much easier. This explains
why the Vietnamese did not greet the American soldiers as heroes. Instead the lack of a warm
welcome disappointed the American soldiers. Also, the South Koreans fully depended on U.S.
aid in the war for survival, furthering the idea that it was a just war. The same reasoning applied
to Vietnam. 59 In Korea, the war stalemated, resulting in losses, but a clear stop of the spread of
communism into South Korea, a victory in some American’s eyes. Conversely, in Vietnam the
North Vietnamese overpowered the South and unified as a single state under communism two
years after the U.S. left, a clear loss in most American’s eyes. 60
The Korean War convinced most Americans that the Soviet Union controlled
communism worldwide. This led to the belief that the real enemy was not in Korea (or later in
Vietnam), but in Moscow, so fighting anyone else was pointless. This mode of thinking gives
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one explanation for why the public opposed Vietnam more than Korea. Ultimately, the memory
of the Korean War led to the disapproval of Vietnam.61
The Major Differences Between the Two Wars
Despite the impact on Vietnam, the Korean War did have some differences that should be
mentioned. In Korea, the public and soldiers always saw the enemy as evil. This contrasts with
Vietnam, where many perceived the U.S. as the evil side. This made people tolerant towards the
Korean War and the opposite towards the Vietnam War. Another key difference is international
countries and organizations (like the United Nations) supported the Korean War but not
Vietnam, so blame for the failure in Vietnam fell solely on the U.S. Despite the Korean War
stalemating with no clear victory, many Americans convinced themselves that the U.S. won the
war since South Korea successfully resisted communism. As far as collective memory of
politicians and policy makers is concerned, it seems they forgot the Korean War since they failed
to learn the lessons by replicating the Korean War in the almost identical war in Vietnam. 62
The U.S. struggled to contain communism in Vietnam more than in Korea due to the
early support of allowing French colonialism to remain in Vietnam. This prevented any natural
pro-western revolution from happening, unlike in Korea. French colonialism in Vietnam meant
the people did not have access to politics and the military. On the other hand, Korea already
implemented a system capable of fighting communism. This prevented Vietnamese supporters
of western governments to create nationalism, making it difficult to unite the people.
Additionally, French colonialism discouraged anti-communist leaders to accept U.S. support
because they viewed it as swapping one colonial power for another. They wanted full
independence, which the Viet-Minh (and eventually Viet Cong) offered them. The U.S. tried to
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set up a self-sustaining government that could combat the influence of communism on its own
through their policy of containment. After they hypothetically accomplished this goal, the U.S.
would withdraw, leaving Korea and Vietnam independent. This idea exemplifies the American
mindset and their perceived justification for their actions in these wars. Another difference
between the wars was Vietnam’s pro-communist population was too strong compared to the
weak anti-communist population, which was not the case in Korea. All of this information is
necessary to understand the collective memory of Vietnam and the sensory experience of the
soldiers.63
The relationships between the presidents and the public of this time period typifies part of
the collective memory of the Vietnam War. The American people wanted moderation when it
came to the Vietnam War. The 1964 presidential election, in which Lyndon B. Johnson won by
a landslide, supports this claim. At that point, Johnson resisted aggression in Vietnam compared
to his later years, which plagued his presidency. In fact, shortly after winning the election he
started bombing North Vietnam. Once the war started to negatively affect the economy in the
U.S., the people quickly began to disapprove of the war. Combined with the ongoing Civil
Rights Movement, the Vietnam War created a massive counterculture that prominently impacted
American memory, in both good and bad ways. 64
Like Korea, negotiating while fighting characterized the later part of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. President Nixon, who wanted to end the war, spearheaded these actions, but he did not
want to stop fighting due to his hatred of communism. Nixon also tried to censor the pentagon
papers, which revealed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations constantly lied to the American
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people about the war. By doing so, Nixon ensured a higher readership of the papers, creating
even more disdain toward the war.65
Finally, the Orthodox Theory indicates a key difference concerning both memory and the
senses. Harry Spiller explains the Orthodox Theory states that people view the world and its
population as split up into diametrically opposed good and bad guys. The majority of the United
States population accepted this theory in the Cold War era. Naturally, the public viewed foreign
powers who contrasted with American ideals as the foes. The Soviet Union made the top of the
list with its threat of communism. The Cuban Missile Crisis further indurated this accepted
memory. This idea slowly began to deteriorate due to the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights
Movement. The combination of these two events forced people to reconsider who the foes really
were. Some even changed their minds and thought of themselves (America) as the bad guys.
Still, some viewed “the other” as the bad guy, accepting the narrative of the Orthodox Theory. 66
The increased accessibility of the television attributed to people seeing the U.S. as in the
wrong. Americans in the 1960’s (and even more so in the 1970’s) accessed television and its
programs on a wider scale. While the television was certainly in American homes in the 1950’s
during the Korean War, mostly only upper- and middle-class citizens owned one. Conversely,
working-class citizens (who, as Appy pointed out, were the majority of people who fought in the
Vietnam War), managed to obtain television sets by the time the Vietnam War began. Plus, for
those who owned a television, TV networks and news stations displayed their information much
differently in the early 1950’s than during the Vietnam era. TV networks typically resisted
showing combat and dying soldiers/citizens during the Korean War, but that occurred during the
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Vietnam War. The majority of the population still used radios to access the media in the 1950’s.
This meant people during the Korean War received their news primarily through auditory means.
The more widespread accessibility of the television during the Vietnam era added the visual
sense to media on a massive scale. This is a significant change between the Korean and Vietnam
War. As noted in Smith’s Sensing the Past, many sensory historians argue the visual sense is the
most important in today’s society due to our reliance on our eyes to obtain information. While
Smith disagrees with this notion, American society certainly seems to obtain information in this
way most often. If this is true, then the television with its added sensory stimuli attributes as one
of the main reasons for the split of memory in the Vietnam era. For some, seeing the war in a
visual sense altered their thought processes enough to convince themselves that the U.S.
approached world affairs incorrectly. As far as the Orthodox Theory is concerned, the television
switched people’s perspectives into viewing the American’s as the bad guys.67
In addition to the new visual sense that the American population experienced during the
Vietnam War, another reason for some people seeing the U.S. as the bad guys came from an
influx of misleading information by the U.S. government. The government/military gave
families false information concerning their loved ones who fought in the war. The family of
Sergeant Stephen M. Malley experienced this. The government informed them that Malley
received injuries in combat, but they reassured the family that his condition was stable. Shortly
after, they received a picture of Malley bandaged from head-to-toe. In reality, Malley received
“multiple shrapnel wounds to the chest wall, left flank, back, buttock, abdomen, and lower
extremities.”68 Shrapnel even found its way into his stomach and liver. After this incident, a
priest gave him his last rites and told him he would shortly die. From his family’s perspective,
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the photograph initiated the doubt of his safety, but his voice from a phone call confirmed their
fears of his perilous situation. In this case, it seems that the picture and the visual sense was not
enough to make his family realize the Vietnam War was unjustified. They likely resisted
changing their mind about the war despite television and experiencing the war through that
modality. However, the added sensory stimulus of hearing their son’s weak voice over the
phone finally made them flip the switch and view the war as unjust, realize the government lied
to them, and their son was not safe. They viewed the government as the enemy, even though
their son ultimately fought in the war. They shifted the blame onto the government for their
façade of a justified war.69
Doctors failed to fully remove the shrapnel from Malley’s body. As a result, he lived the
rest of his life in constant pain. Unfortunately, the doctors’ responded by prescribing him
various painkillers. The painkillers helped very little, but he grew addicted to them nonetheless.
He also suffered with anxiety and nervousness, undoubtedly a side effect of the physical and
mental trauma he experienced in the war. His mind deteriorated as well, leading to delusions and
seizures. Doctors and psychiatrists failed to explain if these occurrences resulted from mental
trauma or the drugs. He eventually died due to cardio-pulmonary failure, leaving his pregnant
wife alone. She fought for over a year to receive benefits from the Veteran’s Administration.
Clearly, the American system failed to adequately treat Malley and his family for his service.
Many Vietnam veterans share Malley’s addiction to painkillers, which explains why many
remember them as drug addicts after the war. However, Malley’s story shows how it was not his
fault. Who the blame resides in (the doctors, government, war commanders, a combination of all
three) is ultimately not clear.70
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Mental Trauma Among Vietnam War Soldiers
The Vietnam War was a unique experience for soldiers: there were no clear battle lines,
the enemy often used surprise tactics, soldiers commonly feared deadly devices like booby traps
and mines, and soldiers struggled distinguishing between the enemy and the citizens. They also
struggled finding purpose in the war, resulting in their solitary goal to stay alive. Also, the
average age of a Vietnam soldier was nineteen (compared to twenty-six in WWII), meaning
more of these soldiers were mentally less mature. Soldiers easily accessed hard drugs like heroin
to help them cope with their actions. Finally, soldiers rotated into battle based on a
predetermined time span of service, as opposed to previous wars where troops rotated based on
their units. This caused soldiers to act independently, instead of focusing more on the team
effort.71
Surprisingly, the number of psychological casualties, or casualties caused by mental
trauma, in Vietnam was only 12 per 1,000. This is low compared to Korea (37 per 1,000) and
World War II (120 per 1,000). On-the-sight psychiatrists helped contributed to these low
numbers among Vietnam soldiers. In many cases, Vietnam veterans did not experience
increased mental disorders compared to the general U.S. population. For example, while
Vietnam veterans suffered a relatively high suicide rate, this rate differed little from the general
population in the U.S. Nonetheless, cultural images of Vietnam veterans as a mentally disturbed
population prevailed. Movies like Taxi Driver and Deer Hunter showed Vietnam veterans as
suicidal and homicidal. These images demonstrate the split in society over the war. This split
was not presented as strongly in popular culture after World War II and Korea. The split
highlights how veteran’s experiences and problems became overemphasized to show people’s
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moral disdain towards the war. This was certainly not the only contradiction in the collective
memory of the Vietnam War, however.72
Another contradiction in the collective memory of the Vietnam War involves how the
populace treated veterans who managed to return home. People not in support of the war
believed they treated veterans humanely, while people who did support it believed others treated
them like scum and spat on them when they returned. In many cases, both are correct. They did
not return home as heroes like veterans in the past (and like Korean veterans), but polls taken at
the time indicate most Vietnam veterans felt they received a positive welcome home. The polls
recorded no instances of people spitting on veterans.73
In addition to the conflicting memory of the treatment of veterans, the group called the
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) created disruptions in the collective memory. The
group formed to protest against the war. They argued the government forced veterans to
experience trauma because the government made them go to war through the draft. Additionally,
they believed doctors, psychiatrists, and the government inadequately treated veterans for their
mental traumas. The VVAW compared their experience and mental state to Holocaust survivors
who felt guilty for living while many of their companions died. Besides protesting, the VVAW
formed rap groups where veterans congregated and discussed the problems they faced. These
groups opposed the mainstream belief of soldiers needing to be emotionless by encouraging each
other to express their feelings. A psychiatrist who worked closely with VVAW, Robert Jay
Lifton, argued that if no mental disorders presented itself shortly after the war, then it did not
automatically veterans could not develop them later. When veterans realized the repulsiveness
of their wartime misdeeds, then guilt formed, which psychiatrists almost always associated with
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Vietnam veteran’s trauma. The VVAW contributed one last aspect to the image of Vietnam
veterans. They advocated for the recognition of a disorder where trauma does not appear until a
longer period after the event. By doing so, they helped initiate the concept of PTSD, which
undoubtedly caused many to associate Vietnam veterans to the disorder. For this reason, people
associate PTSD more with Vietnam veterans than other war veterans, even though Vietnam
veterans suffer with PTSD somewhat less.74
Studies conducted after the recognition of PTSD in 1980 showed that Vietnam veterans
did not experience the disorder much more than Korean and WWII veterans. All three wars saw
cases of PTSD in about 1-2% of the veteran populations. However, since the VVAW helped
create the concept of PTSD, the public associated them with it more than other veterans. By the
1980’s, this caused people to remember Vietnam veterans as people with mental impairments
instead of the “politically active, anti-war veteran in the American memory” prior.75 This
information is not meant to negate the impact the war had on the mental abilities of Vietnam
veterans. Fifty-eight thousand American soldiers died in Vietnam, yet scholars estimate an
additional sixty thousand killed themselves in the years that followed. Considering how more
killed themselves after the war than the amount that actually died during the war demonstrates
the severe mental damage the war caused.76
Vietnam veterans struggled to find a sense of purpose, leading to mental damage. The
government and military recruiters misinformed them about their duties. The government stated
they wanted to help the Vietnamese people, stop communism, and maintain worldwide respect.
The real goal, according to the Vietnam veterans that Christian G. Appy interviewed, was to kill
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as many Vietnamese as possible. Compared to World War II, in which most soldiers felt a sense
of purpose for fighting, Vietnam soldiers built relationships in the belief that they fought a
purposeless war and nobody cared about them except other soldiers. They based these feelings
on their visual sense. Many soldiers killed Vietnamese civilians (children, women, and the
elderly), which questioned their concept of an honorable fight. The poverty of the Vietnamese
also forced American soldiers to question their purpose in Vietnam. Back home, society viewed
the soldiers themselves as poor, but in Vietnam the soldiers considered themselves wealthy
compared to the Vietnamese peasants, They faced a difficult dilemma in this regard, especially
when they returned home.77
For the soldiers that developed PTSD, they failed to show symptoms until five to ten
years after returning home. The Reagan era occurred at this time: a time period where people
supported anti-war veterans much less. In general, most war veterans felt outsiders cannot
understand what they went through, but civilians typically supported the veterans’ actions.
Vietnam veterans developed paranoias due to less support from the public.78
Despite Corcoran indicating POW’s had more likely of a chance to develop PTSD, this
does not mean other soldiers were immune to the condition. In fact, Henry Barber, a casualty
reporter whose wrote letters of sympathy to the families of dead soldiers, experienced trauma
even though he never engaged in battle. If soldier failed to recognize a fallen comrade, Barber
retrieved dental records and fingerprints, so he saw their mangled bodies. He coped with these
experiences by using drugs and alcohol. Nonetheless, Henry still dreams of the experiences. His
story demonstrates how PTSD can affect anyone, regardless of their role in Vietnam. 79

77

Chritian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam, (Durham: University of North
Carolina Press, 2000), 207-208, 227, 242, 296-297.
78
Appy, 310, 316-317.
79
Appy, 257.

44

There is a dynamic relationship between the collective memory of the U.S. population
and the mental health of the Vietnam veteran. Estimates of Vietnam soldiers who suffered from
Delayed Stress Syndrome ranges from 500,000-800,000. In many cases, American culture
denies Vietnam veteran’s experiences. It the 1980’s, the public began to recognize the soldiers’
trauma. The collective memory remembers PTSD in Vietnam veterans resulting from there not
being enough time for them to decompress and return to society. Society believed that the time
of Vietnam veterans being in combat then returning home was shorter than previous wars. As a
result, the American public thought Vietnam veterans suffered more from PTSD, but that was
simply not the case. Psychiatrists and the public in general simply understood PTSD better in
the Vietnam era compared to the 1940s and 1950s. The collective memory also remembers them
not being treated and supported by society adequately. While this may be true, it is too simple of
an explanation. Vietnam soldiers’ moral contradictions and their inability to justify their actions
caused much of their mental stress. Appy argues society as a whole failed to help the veterans
the way they needed. The antiwar movement certainly hindered the help, but the movement
should not receive full blame like the collective memory often suggests. Appy also argues an
inability to connect with others and disapproval from people back home led to an increased level
of paranoia among Vietnam veterans compared to other war veterans. With less soldiers
participating in the war compared to the World Wars, Vietnam veterans struggled to connect
with others who served in the war. More people served in World War II, meaning when they
returned home, more people connected and talked about their experiences. This was not the case
for many Vietnam veterans since there was not as much of the population that served, making
people who shared their experiences more sparsely spread out. For those who formed groups
and talked about their experiences, they felt hope for their future identity, unlike many who
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missed that opportunity. More people possessed the will to forget at this time as well. The My
Lai Massacre, described later, is an example of forgetting when it comes to collective memory
because many do not remember it, even though it was one of the most notorious and publicized
atrocities of the war.80
The Tet Offensive and Collective Memory
The Tet Offensive influenced the collective memory of the Vietnam War. While most
see the Tet Offensive as a failure (the North Vietnamese tried to obtain power in the cities, but
they failed to hold any city for longer than three weeks, all while losing 58,000 troops), it
succeeded in causing public opinion of the war in the U.S. to drop dramatically. As a result, the
military requested more American troops, which meant more casualties, higher taxes, and an
increase in the draft. The Defense Department and the American public disapproved of such
actions. The government denied the request. After Tet, a Gallup poll revealed 49% of
Americans believed the U.S. should never have gotten involved in Vietnam. It also showed only
33% believed the U.S. was making progress in the war (a drop from 50% before Tet). The
media increasingly opposed the war, with Walter Cronkite (the CBS anchorman) declaring his
opposition to the war. When this happened, Johnson said, “If I’ve lost Walter then it’s over.
I’ve lost Mr. Average Citizen.”81 The shift to disapproving of the war negatively impacted the
collective memory. A Harris poll conducted in 1971 concluded that 71% of the U.S. population
believed the U.S. should never have gotten involved in Vietnam. This poll also revealed that
58% of Americans believed the war to be immoral. The longer the war went on, the more people
disapproved of it.82
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The Tet Offensive impacted the media significantly. Prior to this event, the media
revealed the narrative that the military wanted the public to know. The military encouraged
media companies to do this because the companies increased their chances of receiving military
reports before those who did not go along with the narrative. Also, the journalists dismisses
most atrocities until they brought the stories back into focus later in the war, when the public
largely no longer supported the war. This means the American public may not have learned
about atrocities until years after they happened. The Tet Offensive made this status quo change
because it media outlets heavily broadcasted it, revealing the brutality of the war. Images of
civilian casualties occurred 3.9 times a week during the Tet Offensive, which was four times as
much of the average occurrences throughout the entire war.83
In Their Own Words: The Tet Offensive
A letter by Gerald W. Massy III to his daughter illustrates the sensory experience of the
Tet Offensive among U.S. soldiers. Massy notified his daughter of his move to some unfinished
barracks. This building had no bedding for mattresses, no lighting (other than emergency lights),
no windows or doors, and no latrine. These are obviously not ideal conditions, considering he
would likely be exposed to the outdoors due to no windows. He was blind in the darkness due to
the absence of lights, and there were unsanitary bathroom conditions due to no latrines. He also
explained much of the light came from flares, while much of what he heard echoed from a
constant barrage of gunfire. Massy shared feelings with many veterans from previous wars back
home: he worried the men lacked the courage to fight like the men in WWII did. He attributed
this to Vietnam soldier’s willingness to express their feelings. He even claimed people like this
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are more dangerous than communists or Nazis.84 Massy reveals an instance where a Vietnam
soldier opposed the counterculture found on college campuses. His ideas support the claim that
people viewed Vietnam soldiers as being less brave than soldiers in the past. His experiences
exemplify the sensory experience many likely had during the Tet Offensive. By having to find
safety in unfinished barracks, he survived despite enduring a discomforting situation. For many
who shared similar scenarios, their new sensory experience caused by the Tet Offensive led to
feelings of displacement, peril, and fear.
Opposition to the War
Some groups within the counterculture held more prominence than others. Student
protestors fit into this distinction. Despite feelings of purposelessness in the war, Vietnam
veterans generally resented the student protestors because they viewed the protests as the middle
class flaunting their superiority (remember, according to Appy most Vietnam soldiers were
working-class citizens). This opposition stemmed from class differences, not ideological
disputes, unlike how the collective memory remembers it today. Middle class college students
contrasted clearly with working-class veterans, which made the protests seem like an attack on
veterans as opposed to the war itself. Veterans envied those who did not endure the war, while
simultaneously trying to justify their actions in Vietnam.85
Veterans themselves opposed the war as well. In the summer of 1971, the same summer
Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers, an organization called the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War formed. This group, consisting of mostly honorably discharged veterans who
received medals, famously met in Washington D.C. and threw their medals away before a crowd
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of thousands. This convinced the American people even more of a seemingly unjust war
occurring in Vietnam. This group represented the veteran’s disdain towards the war by rejecting
their honor of medals. They rejected this honor due to their sensory experiences they
encountered in Vietnam. They shaped the collective memory of Vietnam as an unjust war by
their actions.86
Warrior Image in Vietnam
At the start of the Vietnam War, people viewed the warrior image as one similar to the
image during the Korean War: one that stirred disturbing, somewhat contradictory, yet also
sympathetic feelings. This can be attributed partially to the television news networks initially
seeing themselves as allies with the president; therefore, the networks portrayed the war in a
positive way. When it came to atrocities, the media revealed they occurred more from South
Vietnamese against North Vietnamese. First of all, the North committed atrocities too, but they
covered them up better considering they lacked as free of a press, which allowed journalists to
witness the combat. Secondly, media painted the American soldier as a witness to these
atrocities, rather than an instigator. This eventually changed.87
Like in World War II and Korea, the press and the public hungered to learn what the war
was really like. In this case, they asked for more than they bargained for. CBS’s Robert
Schakne said it perfectly: “It’s nothing like a John Wayne movie.”88 Wayne conjured up a
similar image on the big screen. Schakne’s contradiction of this image highlights the
discrepancy between the public’s warrior to the actual fighter in Vietnam. This discrepancy is
one reason for the split in memory. The Tet Offensive altered the warrior image to more of a
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negative one due to all the media coverage it had back in the United States. While the
experiences during the Tet Offensive happened throughout the years prior, the American public
saw it for the first time on a massive scale. From there, the warrior image deteriorated.89
After the Tet Offensive, the media transitioned from ally of the White House to nemesis.
It is important to note that this was not a complete turnaround. The media prior to the Tet
Offensive certainly did not romanticize the war or paint it in a glorified way. It simply went
along with how the president wanted the war to be seen. The Tet Offensive saw a break in this
relationship, thus a break with the government as a whole as well. Journalists at the time have
been criticized for showing too much and showing too little of the war. This is yet another
example of a split memory. 90
After 1968, the warrior image of American soldiers altered. While still seen as victims, it
was in a new way. By 1970, the public saw them as drug abusers, officer killers, and
accomplices to atrocities. Still, people viewed them as victims because it they believed the
military molded them like that. William Calley, the officer blamed for the My Lai Massacre,
exemplifies this victimization of the soldiers from both left and right political spectrums. 91
The warrior image during the Vietnam War reflected that of a baby killer. Antiwar
protests back home by Vietnam veterans [particularly by the group Vietnam Veterans Against
the War (VVAW)] actually helped strengthen the warrior image as one of a baby killer. These
veterans admitted to killing children, but they argued there was no other option. Still, this
reinforced the baby killer image because veterans admitted to literally killing babies. Veterans
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resisted this version of the image for obvious reasons. The VVAW demonstrations showed the
public of the lost innocence as a result of the war.92
African-American Warrior Image in Vietnam
American citizens from all backgrounds considered African-American soldiers equal in
warrior abilities compared to their white counterparts (at least prior to 1968 and the Civil Rights
Act). This differed from the African-American warrior image in the Korean War. In the military
during the Vietnam War, African-Americans saw equality like they never had before, even
though officers disproportionately sent them to the front lines more often than whites at the
beginning of the war. This image contradicted with how whites viewed African-Americans
within U.S. borders. In Vietnam, many felt they earned the status of a man, both in a masculine
sense, but also in a human sense. This feeling of equality gave them encouragement back home
to fight for it, culminating in the Civil Rights Movement.93
To the African-American, they viewed warrior image as one who fought two wars – one
in Vietnam against communism and the other in the United States against racism and
discrimination. Equality in Vietnam encouraged the other side of the two-front war to fight back
home. Interestingly, many Vietnam-era African-American soldiers critiqued the rioting of the
Civil Right Movement, but they supported the protests.94
Another distinction between the African-American soldier abroad and their counterparts
back home in the United States is that the former typically disagreed with Martin Luther King
Jr.’s calls to not fight in Vietnam. This was one of the few (and in some cases the only)
philosophical ideas African-American soldiers disagreed with Dr. King. The soldiers saw their
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own personal plight reflected in the Vietnamese people who yearned for freedom. To many,
they supported the war for this reason. By fighting for the Vietnamese and their freedom, they
symbolically fought for their own freedom back home. They clearly differed on their
perspective of the war compared to their white counterparts. This alternate viewpoint explains
why a split in memory between African-Americans and whites occurred.95
The My Lai Massacre
Robert Rheault, a Vietnam veteran once said regarding fear and combat, “You don’t have
the luxury to indulge in fear because other people’s lives depend upon you keeping your head
cold. You know, when something goes wrong, they call it emotional numbing. It’s not very
good in civilian life, but it’s pretty useful in combat – to be able to get absolutely very cold about
what needs to be done and to stick with it. To me, it’s a little bit distressing to realize that I was
at my best doing something as terrible as war.”96 Rheault’s allegory of emotional coldness
relates to the sense of touch. By relating his emotions to the feelings of coldness and numbness,
he exposes the collective memory of a cold-hearted soldier absent of a conscience. Many people
remember the soldiers who participated in the My Lai Massacre as cold-hearted due to war. This
event is the root of this memory.
An event arguably as important, if not more so, than the Korean War on the collective
memory of the Vietnam War was the My Lai Massacre. On March 16, 1968, the mass slaughter
of mostly women, children, and old men incapable of defending themselves occurred. American
soldiers raped many of the women before killing and torturing others. U.S. soldiers killed
approximately four hundred Vietnamese citizens that day in the My Lai village. The soldiers
reporting the event considered the deaths accidental. The military attributed rumors of what
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actually happened to enemy propaganda. For an entire year, the small amount of people within
the public aware of the event accepted this version of the story until an investigation finally
started after stories of what actually happened circulated to Ronald Ridenhour, who wrote
multiple letters asking for an investigation. Through the investigation, a military council charged
William Calley (the Lieutenant in charge of American forces during the incident) with murder
and the shooting of 109 Vietnamese civilians. His trial brought the massacre to the American
public through the media. Twenty-four officers and soldiers were charged with crimes, but all
achieved an acquittal except Calley. Even then, the jury originally sentenced Calley to life
imprisonment with hard labor, but by 1976, he was pardoned. The media, however,
acknowledged the significance of this event even if the government failed to. This event marked
a major turning point of Americans seeing the war as necessary to pointless. It made Americans
question the morality of not only the war, but the U.S. itself. Despite its importance, American
memory forgot the event. If people remember it, they likely see it as an unfortunate
circumstance that occurred during the war. The underlying question here is “why?” 97
The overall attempt to forget the war in its entirety (much like the Korean War) partially
explains why the American collective memory forgot the My Lai Massacre. This forgetting is
attributed to the fact the Vietnam War does not align with the American narrative of winning an
honorable war. After all, the U.S. lost, and it was certainly not honorable. Political rhetoric and
portrayals of the war by popular culture through mediums such as film aids this forgetfulness.
These modes of forgetting portrayed the soldier’s themselves as the victims, which has been
what the collective memory now remembers, as opposed to alternate victims such as the
Vietnamese citizens. Vietnam veterans challenge this victimized idea. Largely out of guilt, their
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writings reveal who they saw as the true victims: the Vietnamese citizens. At the time, the
public focused on who was to blame when this massacre occurred instead of on the victims.
Many blamed the government and the people on top like the president. Because of the blame
placed on the government instead of the soldiers themselves, people viewed William Calley as
the victim who acted against his will. Calley represented all Vietnam soldiers in the collective
memory, which explains why the collective memory forgot the My Lai Massacre. The public
incorrectly labeled the victim in this case.98 This event caused more conflicting images because
the public never heard of an American soldier committing an atrocity.99
With the question of who is to blame aside, the question of how and why this happened
needs to be answered to better comprehend the Vietnam soldier’s mindset and sensory
experience. Ethics confused many during the war. Since the military used the body count to
determine success, they normalized the killing of anyone to create a higher body count.
Additionally, the widespread use of bombing/air attacks did not discriminate between civilian
and enemy, resulting in a high civilian casualty rate. They normalized atrocities as well, creating
an acceptable military culture of rape and mutilation. Nonetheless, there is no clear consensus
on the soldier’s view of My Lai. A survey indicated a variety of responses. Some said they
experienced similar mentalities, others could understand the mentality due to the stress of
combat, yet others said they never heard or experienced the mindset that went into My Lai. This
indicates a more conflicting narrative that alters the collective memory. 100
The media played a significant role in fashioning the memory and narrative of My Lai.
Prior to the Tet Offensive, the media watered down atrocities to appeal more to advertisers who
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did not want their ads associated with the atrocities. Telling the stories in full detail also pushed
people away from their media outlet because the atrocities disgusted people. However, even
after Tet, the media excessively censored their stories. It was not until twenty-one months after
My Lai that the event finally made the news, although initially on a small scale due to other
media-excessive news stories (like the moon landing). Once journalists discovered pictures of
the incident, the story grabbed national attention. This demonstrates the importance of the visual
sense on collective memory. Without seeing the pictures, the American public ignored the
possibility of atrocities committed by U.S. soldiers. The pictures revealed desolation and
destruction implemented by American boys. By seeing the destruction of My Lai, the American
public struggled to deny the immoral actions taken by the United States. Without the pictures,
the public likely would have never known about My Lai.101
My Lai became front page news because soldiers testified. They provided a source
outside of the military officials who routinely provided the information of the war. My Lai also
initiated the massive use of pictures to portray the war. This created an entirely new visual sense
of the war for the public. Despite this coverage, a large amount of U.S. citizens did not believe
the story was true. To combat this unbelief, the media decided to focus on an individual to
minimize the complexity of the event. They focused of course on William Calley and his trial.
This led to a poll where 96% of respondents said they had heard of Calley and the My Lai
Massacre. The frequent use of Calley’s image in relation to My Lai caused the American public
to feel badly for him. This created an image of not only Calley, but the Vietnam soldier as a
victim. The use of soldier’s accounts in the media gave credibility to the story because the
soldiers themselves who experienced shaped the narrative. Despite these reports, most of the
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public believed this type of event was natural to war (65%) while only 22% felt repulsed.
Another 55% believed the government used Calley as a scapegoat for the government’s immoral
actions. This indicates the American public was vastly immune to the violence that
characterized the war; therefore, a majority of Americans still supported the war and soldiers,
even after learning of atrocities.102
This event completely changed how many Americans viewed the U.S. involvement in the
war, yet some believed the media presented fake pictures of the massacre, thus furthering the
argument that there was a split in the collective memory of the Vietnam War. While some
whites believed in the dominant white memory of heroic, valiant soldiers, others changed their
beliefs to align more with the African-American counter-memory of an unjust and immoral
American system. Also, most protestors attributed this event to the government, not the actual
soldiers who participated in the massacre because they argued the government trained the men.
In some cases, protestors compared the My Lai Massacre and the war trials that proceeded to
Nazi Germany and the Nuremberg Trials. The letters by Ridenhour that sparked the media
attention of the massacre showed a conflict of American ideals and the Vietnam War. He writes,
“As far as I was concerned, it was a reflection on me, on every American, on the ideals that
supposedly represent. It completely castrated the whole picture of America.” 103 This quote
represents many Vietnam veteran’s thoughts. It shows a struggle of acceptance of what they did
and what America represented. Eventually, when the media discovered the event, television
helped alert the whole nation to the massacre.104
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Calley defended himself inconsistently, which turned the public against him. Still, once
the jury convicted Calley, most of the public believed others should receive some of the blame,
instead of an individual. Calley accepted the punishment seemingly with a sense of duty. This
regained him sympathy from the public, who saw his conviction as martyr-like. The media
viewed the sympathy given to Calley as a clear sign of moral degeneration of the American
public. Another reason people supported Calley after his conviction was they believed he simply
followed orders. A Harris poll in 1971 revealed 76% believed this to be true. It seems people
always blamed someone higher. A Gallup poll supported this by concluding 69% believed the
higher orders in government are to blame.105
Other veterans started to speak out, claiming they committed similar actions as Calley.
This not only indicated the magnitude of atrocities committed in Vietnam, but it also created
even more confusion and difficulty in distinguishing one action (My Lai) to the entirety of the
war. Veterans saw Calley’s case as an opportunity to alert the public to what really happened in
Vietnam. Positive public attitude shifted almost completely towards deterioration at this time.
They accepted the truth of American atrocities more willingly and listened to veterans who made
those claims. Veterans increasingly started calling for an end to the war. Many shared the belief
that the whole country should be on trial for the crimes committed. People from all walks of life
connected these atrocities to the cause of veteran’s mental health issues, which people now
seemingly blamed the U.S. as a whole. Most of the public denied this, but the fact that the whole
nation could be blamed for the atrocities left a negative memory collectively, which people
inevitably desired to forget. Oliver convincingly argues, “A memory of collective indifference
to the consequences of war, therefore, contributed to assertions that the American nation itself
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bore responsibility for the massacre…”106 Some Americans felt this way because they saw
themselves in William Calley, and they did not like the reflection. However, they likely did not
feel guilty for the actions committed. With this type of thinking, a number of Americans likely
saw the images of My Lai and saw them as their own crimes. Since responsibility was not clear
for events like My Lai and the war in general, people managed to forget the atrocities more
easily and see the war as an abstract event. With new writings detailing the atrocities of the U.S.
in the Philippines and against the Native Americans emerging at this time, people accepted more
willingly that Vietnam was just another chapter in American history. This profoundly impacted
the collective memory of the war. 107
When it came to African-Americans, My Lai also contributed to their collective memory.
A larger portion of the South (50%) supported the events of My Lai compared to the East (25%)
and West (36%). A cultural collective memory of the Civil War contributed to this, one in which
southern populations viewed total destruction as necessary to win in war (like what General
Sherman did to the South). This created even more conflict among African-Americans since
they lived mostly in the South.108
It has been proven that the American public possessed little empathy or sympathy for the
Vietnamese and the victims in My Lai. This indicates a lack of guilt by the American public.
Without guilt, the American public collectively forgot the event and the memory deteriorated,
much like most of the events of Vietnam. However, Oliver acknowledges some forgetting must
occur in order for a society to progress. When PTSD became an accepted disorder in 1980, the
most common denominator of PTSD among Vietnam veterans were admittances to committing
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atrocities. The association of Vietnam veterans to PTSD created an image of victimhood, again
ignoring the countless Vietnamese who died in this event.109
In Their Own Words: The My Lai Massacre
Much like the Korean War and the Tet Offensive, accounts of soldiers demonstrate a
general soldier’s viewpoint on the My Lai Massacre. A letter written by Bob Leahy to his family
regarding My Lai exemplifies a soldier’s viewpoint. He argued the media incorrectly interpreted
the situations in Vietnam because the media portrayed combat in much too simplistic terms.
Most of the time, soldiers make assumptions to ensure safety. With this reasoning, Leahy
expressed little surprise that a massacre like My Lai occurred. He did not condone the events,
but he thought people who blamed those soldiers for their actions did not fully comprehend
human nature. He argued the casualties of war shaped soldiers to feel hatred towards the
Vietnamese. Also, he wrote that a soldier cannot be blamed for killing an unarmed citizen while
he wanted to make it home in one piece. Essentially, he argued that soldiers faced dilemmas all
the time in which clear answers cease to exist.110 Leahy’s letter is an example of the conflicting
emotions and beliefs about My Lai. While My Lai sparked outrage back in the U.S., soldiers in
Vietnam viewed the incident as wrong, but not valid for condemnation. Events like My Lai
happened due to complex circumstances that people back home struggled to understand.
Whether the media or Leahy (and other Vietnam soldiers) are correct is open to interpretation.
Both acknowledge the unnecessary actions of the massacre, but they disagree on the
consequences. Perhaps, they were both right and wrong in their own regards, yet there may not
necessarily be a right and wrong as well.
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Another account concerning My Lai comes from Charles Strong, an African-American
soldier who provided an oral history for Wallace Terry in his book titled Bloods. In Strong’s
testimony, he defended Calley and My Lai. He explained the impossibility of Calley carrying
out the entire massacre on his own and most likely someone instructed him to do the massacre.
He also explained, “We killed a whole lot of innocent gooks by mistake, because they were not
supposed to be there.”111 He explained their religion prevented them from permanently leaving
the areas the soldiers told them to leave. Strong’s oral history shows African-American’s
willingness to understand the culture of the Vietnamese more than the Anglo-Americans.
Nonetheless, his argument in favor of Calley’s actions exemplifies the soldier’s tendency to
support atrocities. Soldiers likely cope with their actions in this way. 112 My Lai clearly
represented a shift in American thought and memory. Of course, soldiers experienced other
sensory elements outside of My Lai.
Though this does not directly connect with the My Lai Massacre, Petty Officer Third
Class George I. Ellis had a relevant perspective on what it was like while fighting in Vietnam. In
an interview with Harry Spiller, he said, “That little girl getting her arm shot off, those kids out
there getting hurt, that old man getting shot, at the time you don’t think about that stuff. You put
it in the back of your mind. But when you have kids, you’re in civilian life, you have a family,
things like that start bothering you because that could be your kids… The kids belonged to
somebody, but at the time you don’t think like that because at the time you’re young… It starts
bothering you later on in life. Those memories start coming forward.”113 Ellis’ account suggests
he (and likely others) slowly realized what they did and witnessed in the war. Nonetheless, those
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memories resurfaced after the war ended. This creates two different narratives from the same
person, which adds to the confusing memory of the Vietnam War. This perspective should act as
a reminder that most struggle conceptualizing fighting in a war first-hand. Many cannot
comprehend switching from “civilian mode” to “soldier mode”. They both require different
kinds of behavior to function properly in their respective settings (and in some cases survive).
This perspective is important when trying to analyze not only the My Lai Massacre, but any war
in general.
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Chapter 3: Imagery and the Media
Propaganda and Psychological Warfare in the Vietnam War Era
Various propaganda media demonstrates how the collective memory of the Vietnam War
split due to sensory stimuli. Propaganda appealed to the senses, which affected the public’s
memory. Psychological warfare from both sides in the form of propaganda created a negative
view of Vietnam in the collective remembrance of the war. For example, North Vietnam
propagandists made radio announcements that appealed to American women to resist the war
due to U.S. terrorism. While not every woman fell under the spell of this propaganda, it still
impacted some, contributing to the counter-memory that Vietnam was an unjust war.
Additionally, until 1967, both Americans and the Vietnamese falsified records to convince
people of vast support. This likely contributed to the illusion perceived by U.S. soldiers that the
Vietnamese wanted them there. When soldiers discovered that the Vietnamese rejected them, a
dilemma occurred for the veterans who intended to help. This shattered the reality of the war,
leading to negative memories as well.114
Propaganda from the North also affected the soldiers themselves. After the deaths of
soldiers, the propagandists claimed over the radio that they died for the warmongers of the U.S.,
alluding to their purposeless deaths. This resonated and amplified soldier’s beliefs that they
fought in a purposeless war. They also claimed the U.S. practiced chemical warfare. The U.S.
Army cleared roadways by burning foliage to prevent ambushes. These acts falsely supported
those claims. This caused the public (especially those under the belief of the counter-memory)
back home to lose support for the war and the soldiers. Despite the North’s success, the U.S.
propaganda to its own people almost always reported good news and indications of progress.
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This contradicted with what many heard and experienced about the war, leading to even less trust
and support for the government.115
Both sides had advantages when it came to psychological warfare. The South
Vietnamese, aided by the U.S., used better technology to spread propaganda, such as more
advanced speakers, radio equipment, and use of paper propaganda like leaflets. They also had
the advantage logistically, while the North Vietnamese had the advantage ideologically. The
North’s ideas appealed to more Vietnamese and other communist countries, resulting in more
international support from communists. Soldiers sending letters home and contradicting with the
propaganda created a disadvantage of the U.S. government’s efforts to control how the public
viewed the war. These soldiers challenged the national narrative is so important when it comes
to creating collective memories. In some cases, media outlets published these letters, which
revealed a low morale and bewilderment in U.S. involvement. This propaganda proved the
pointlessness of the war by the soldier’s themselves, dealing a crushing blow to U.S. efforts.
Northern propagandists successfully targeted U.S. college populations through magazines. In
fact, over one hundred college libraries subscribed to magazines with northern propaganda
within its pages (including universities like the University of California at Berkeley and North
Texas State University). The Soviet Union and China supported this propaganda, seemingly
making the information credible. This information echoed in student protests. 116
For the United States and North Vietnam, they utilized radio as the most common form to
communicate propaganda throughout Vietnam. The U.S. also helped created a TV network,
named Vietnam Television, to allow soldiers to obtain news and entertainment. This acted as a
way to generate propaganda to the general population. Increased bombing also worked as

115
116

Roberts III, 77-80, 89.
Roberts III, 95, 118-120.

63

propaganda because it decimated North Vietnamese morale due to increased psychological fear
of being killed. Despite student protests and the North’s propaganda, the American public still
supported the war in 1966. The antiwar movement failed to gain any success with legislation,
but they succeeded in keeping the war in the public’s eye. While northern propaganda failed to
affect the mass population in the U.S., it managed to attract college students, which ultimately
affected many politicians since their children went to college. There is no clear indication,
however, if this affected American policy. The propaganda described created much of
American’s distaste for Vietnam. In some ways, this propaganda actually proved President
Johnson’s lies about the war. Through the use of radio and television, propaganda impacted
populations and their collective memories by targeting their visual and hearing senses. The
words and images that the public sensed through these modalities conflicted with their memory
of a noble soldier117
TV: The Revolutionary Gateway to Experiencing War
Propaganda leads directly to the impact TV had on the collective memory of the war. In
broad terms, this form of communication created conflicting images, contributing to the split in
collective memory. TV brought the war directly in sight of the average U.S. citizen. It created a
conflicting image of the war due to simultaneously showing U.S. soldiers dying in combat, who
clearly needed U.S. support, while also showing scenes of protest. What was one to believe?
These images caused many to start asking questions about the war, such as “Why are we there?”
TV also created a credibility gap that made the government lose face with the information
provided on the screen. In other words, the press showed the reality of the war, which caused
people to disapprove of it.118
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Images aired on the news of American soldiers burning down villages, which contrasted
with what the American people back home thought was going on. This changed the view of
Americans as victims to the savage aggressors in some citizen’s eyes. News outlets televised
Vietnam more than Korea, which is another explanation to why people reacted to Vietnam more
negatively; the visual and auditory stimuli upset them. One popular TV show, MASH (aired in
1972), depicted the Korean War. Despite the location in the show, the creators meant for it to
represent Vietnam as an analogy, while humanizing the tragedy of war. Once again, this is an
example of how TV and the visual/auditory senses affected collective memory. 119
Two Films, Two Memories
When media creates a sensory artifact that millions can access again and again, the
creators preserve (or alter) collective memory. Movies act as such artifacts, since they appeal to
both sight and hearing. For the Vietnam War, Hollywood abundantly supplies cinematography.
Even then, some movies depict the war in alternate ways. For example, Platoon (1986), starring
Charlie Sheen, portrays Vietnam as a tragedy, one in which the United States was morally
wrong. Conversely, We Were Soldiers (2002), starring Mel Gibson, paints the war in more of a
patriotic way. While the reasons for involvement may not have been right, the movie depicts the
problem being in the government, not in the military. These movies exemplify a split in memory
and the many ways that people have remembered the war.
Each movie possesses some accurate and inaccurate descriptions of the war. Hollywood
and the entertainment factor attributes to these inaccuracies, but blame resides elsewhere as well.
Curiously, neither one hardly mentioned the Korean War, even though the war acted as a model
on how to conduct war in Vietnam. Platoon showed the inhumaneness of the war and how the
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United States demonstrated immoral qualities, but it failed to illustrate that these absences of
morality were not as common as some believed (at least, according to the numerous Vietnam
soldier’s writings already mentioned, who stated the belief that massacres did or could happen,
but not often). Granted, one may argue that one massacre is too many, even in a heightened state
of frustrations that the Vietnam War caused. Still, another may argue that one should not judge a
person’s situation or their choices if we ourselves have not lived through the same or similar
experience.
Platoon also highlighted integration and the use of drugs much more accurately than We
Were Soldiers. In We Were Soldiers, the concept of integration and drug use barely exists. This
movie also showed a clear distinction between right and wrong. In reality, soldiers faced a gray
area of uncertainty when it came to morality. Neither of the movies show the reason for fighting,
other than the implication of an evil enemy. In Platoon, the director portrayed evil from within
the American soldiers, whereas We Were Soldiers placed evil in the Viet-Cong and the ideals
that threatened the United States.
Both of these movies highlight a clear divide in memory. We Were Soldiers glorifies the
war, while Platoon denigrates it. The divide on how the two movies portrayed the Vietnam War
represents the divide in American memory. On one hand, Platoon correlates with people who
remember the war as unjustified and Americans as immoral. On the other hand, We Were
Soldiers justifies the war because Americans fought evil; therefore, Americans need to admire
and glorify the soldiers. There is really no correct or incorrect way to show this war because of
this split memory. Neither correctly or incorrectly describes the war, which emphasizes why the
Vietnam War cannot permeates with obscurity. The alternative memories (in a cultural, racial,
and political sense) make it this way. To distinguish between the two movies (and memories)
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Platoon showed the inhumane (pessimistic) side of the war while We Were Soldiers showed the
humane (optimistic) side of it. In other words, Platoon criticized the war while We Were
Soldiers idolized it.
Platoon and a Critique of Vietnam
Platoon opens to soldiers marching through dense jungle, with many struggling to
navigate through the foliage. The main character, Chris Taylor (played by Charlie Sheen),
merges with veteran soldiers as a new combatant. His fellow soldiers do not respect him due to
his lack of experience. Various hazards, such as snakes, ants, mosquitoes, and heavy rain (all of
which were legitimate dangers) appear in the opening scenes.120
The movie depicts integration, with both white and black soldiers fighting together. Still,
a closer connection exists within the races instead of between the two. Platoon excellently
highlights this concept, considering integration occurred for the first time throughout the entire
Vietnam War. The military implemented integration in the Korean War first, but they did not
allow it until the end of the war. Of course, these soldiers played a pivotal role on film, much
like the people they represented played a significant role in the war as well. Hostility existed
between some of the white and black soldiers in the film. For example, after being insulted by a
white soldier, one black soldier says, “Goddamn man, you break your ass for the white man. No
justice, right?” This quote demonstrates how African-Americans had different perspectives and
experiences during the war, thus creating divergent memories.121
Taylor makes a quote in the beginning of the movie, saying, “Somebody once wrote ‘Hell
is the impossibility of reason.’ That’s what this feels like, Hell.” In other words, the Vietnam
War bred irrationality. The quote sets the stage for depicting the Vietnam War in this way. This
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contrasts with We Were Soldiers, which depicts the war as fighting a clearly defined enemy, one
who soldiers logically identified as the opposition.122
An idea that both movies blame politicians and the government for involvement and
atrocities in Vietnam. This aligns with the memory that many people actually believed. This
memory allowed for the release of William Calley (the only person convicted for the My Lai
Massacre) from prison a few years after a jury sentenced him to life imprisonment. It is
important to remember that while politicians certainly can hold some of the blame for the events
of the Vietnam War, all of the blame does not reside with them. After all, it is the American
people who elect the politicians. Also, people expect other to hold themselves responsible for
their own actions, including soldiers. In other words, blame applies to all of American society
(and Vietnamese) society for the events of the Vietnam War.123
Taylor acknowledges he wanted to serve because his grandfather and his father served in
World War I and World War II respectively. He also says the men fighting mostly came from
small towns, and no one cared about them. This aligns with Appy’s description of the soldiers
being mostly from the working class, yet they fought for the entirety of American society. 124
In another scene, fellow soldiers surround Taylor, and they all smoke marijuana. Taylor
also partakes, and it makes him feel better from the pain caused by a minor injury. All of the
soldiers in this scene appear more relaxed and happier, since the drugs provide an escape from
their dim reality. This scene highlights the memory some have of Vietnam veterans as drug
addicts after returning from the war, which in some cases was true.125

122

Stone (Director), Platoon.
Stone (Director), Platoon.
124
Stone (Director), Platoon.
125
Stone (Director), Platoon.
123

68

A pivoting point in the movie is when the soldiers come across a village inhabited by
farmers. They find weapons and large amounts of rice. Upon questioning, the farmers tell them
that the Viet-Cong forced the villagers to store the supplies. Out of frustration caused by the
death of fellow soldiers earlier in the film, several of the soldiers kill a portion of the unarmed
villagers: one being a handicapped man with one leg and another being a woman who was
yelling about the soldiers killing their pigs. When soldiers kill them, other soldiers chose not to
intervene. Instead, they either cheered the murderers on or stood by silently. This included the
commanding officer. The scene compares to the real-life My Lai Massacre, and it depicts how
situations with the Vietnamese citizens could easily escalate out of mistrust and anger. At the
end of the scene, the soldiers burn down the entire village. Meanwhile, Taylor intervened on
some of the American soldiers who tried to rape some of the women. This event ultimately
divides the platoon between two sergeants who see the event through different morality
perspectives.126
The final fight scene also creates images that are important when looking at memory of
the Vietnam War. To emphasize the difficulty of distinguishing who the enemy was, the scene
consists of Viet-Cong soldiers dressing up as U.S. soldiers. They infiltrate the U.S. line and kill
many of the officers. Aircraft bombers thwart their plans, however. In the end, Taylor shoots
the sergeant who took an active role in the previously mentioned massacre. This allegory
represents how the U.S. fought itself. In fact, one of the closing lines was, “I think now, looking
back, we did not fight the enemy. We fought ourselves. And the enemy was in us. The war is
over for me now, but it will always be there the rest of my days… fighting for my soul.” This
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quote epitomizes the inner struggle numerous soldiers felt concerning the blurred morality lines
they faced in the war.127
We Were Soldiers and the Idolization of Vietnam
We Were Soldiers recreates the events surrounding the first major battle in Vietnam
between the Vietnamese and American forces. The director and produces based the movie off of
a book written by the main character, Hal Moore (played by Mel Gibson), who commanded the
troops in this initial fight. This indicates the movie may depict how many of the Vietnam
soldiers want to remember the war (one of glory and morally correct actions), as opposed to how
they actually remember it (one of shame and immorality).
Before heading off to Vietnam, Moore explains to his daughter that war is something
when people from other countries are killing people, so people like himself go over and stop
them. This alludes to the idea that Americans viewed the Viet-Cong as the bad guys and the
Americans as the good guys in accordance with the Orthodox Theory. This concept erases the
fact the United States government states they tried to prevent the spread of communism, not to
stop mass killings. This depiction justifies the war in the collective memory because it makes
greater sense. Moore appears nervous before going to Vietnam because he fears leading his
troops into a massacre. The movie depicts the war as if the U.S. entered a war where they lacked
a military and technology advantage, which was false.128
Interestingly, Moore mentions the Korean War. In a conversation with another highranking officer, Moore remarks, “Korea didn’t teach them [politicians] anything.” The other
officer sarcastically replies, “Politicians?” This brief conversation (the only time the Korean
War is mentioned in either Platoon or We Were Soldiers) shows that the collective memory
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remembered the war despite ironically being labeled as forgotten, but the lessons that America
evidently neglected could be blamed on the government. This highlights the dominant memory
which believed blamed resided in the government and politicians, not the soldiers themselves.
As mentioned in the section concerning Platoon, this full blame is not justified. Still, the
memory remains.129
The film does not highlight racial integration. Only one African-American soldier
appears to impact the movie and event. Even then, the soldier lacks any lines, but his wife back
home makes his death significant because she speaks occasionally in the film. In this regard, We
Were Soldiers poorly represents African-American’s role in the war, indicating an inaccurate
white perspective and memory in which black soldiers play a minor role in the hardship of the
Vietnam War. In this way, We Were Soldiers represents the dominant white memory. Viewers
who watch this movie witness the glorified soldier and hear patriotic speeches that resonate with
this memory. Mel Gibson, the main actor in The Patriot, resonates with a white audience who
view his concept and memory of America as correct. Despite a lack of African-American
soldiers, Moore makes a speech in the film in which he acknowledges diversity and how they
must accept each other to survive. They must rely on the person next to them, regardless of race,
religion, or creed to preserve their chances of survival. Still, this does not excuse the fact that the
director and producers reserve African-Americans almost exclusively in the role of background
characters. Obviously, this adaptation of the war, though not representative of the war in its
entirety like Platoon, creates and strengthens a memory that does not align with how the countermemory remembers it, especially amongst African-Americans. This type of media creates a
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wider split in the memory of the Vietnam War, one in which African-Americans arbitrarily
played a significant role.130
When the battle occurs, it takes place much like a John Wayne movie in which the
protagonists face overwhelming odds, but due to superior technology and willpower, they
capably kill much more of the enemy. This seemingly justifies the killing of a massive amount
of Viet-Cong. Granted, in this battle, they actually faced overwhelming numbers; nonetheless, it
supports the memory that the Viet-Cong outnumbered Americans throughout the whole war. It
is interesting that this movie came out in 2002, a year after the events of 9/11. One may
speculate that the seemingly justification for killing massive amounts of the enemy was meant to
translate into the conflict in the Middle East as well, much like how MASH was set during the
Korean War, yet it acted as a critique on the Vietnam War. In other words, perhaps the mass
killing of Vietnamese in this movie really represented what the U.S. should do in the Middle
East. Of course, this is mere speculation, and it very well could just be a coincidence. 131
As far as depicting what life was like back home, the movie shows how the wives of the
soldiers handled the loss of their husbands. It fails to show any resistance back home of the war,
which implies no conflict occurred. Of course, this is a false notion. Protestors conducted a vast
amount of protests to the war, but by not showing resistance from within the United States, the
movie refashions a memory that Americans viewed the Vietnam War positively, or in the very
least justified. This is part of the split in memory as well. One side sees the war in more of a
positive light, while the other does not.132
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Another character, Joey Galloway, joins the battle to take pictures. He explains that he
tried to help himself and others back home understand the war. This accurately depicts the
hunger the U.S. population historically has had to know what wars are really like. The director
interestingly represented Galloway as someone who viewed the war in a positive way as opposed
to rejecting the actions the soldiers partake in. This certainly was representative of the media in
the early stages of the war (which is when this movie takes place), but it misrepresents how the
media reacted to the war later on, when they portrayed the war in a negative way to the public.133
How Vietnamese soldiers are shown in the movie is somewhat contradictory. For the
most part, the director portrays them as a formidable enemy, capable of besting the United
States. They oppose American ideals and require elimination. Nonetheless, the director refrains
from completely dehumanizing them. For example, the movie highlights one soldier who almost
kills Moore, but Moore kills him first. Moore discovers the soldier kept a picture of a woman
(presumably his wife). This information reflects the duality of war, one in which the enemy
shares much in common with the Americans. Unfortunately, the director severely under
develops this concept, and it comes off as more of an afterthought. In addition to this soldier, the
director emphasizes the Viet-Cong commander. In one of the final scenes, the commander walks
amongst the dead bodies of his soldiers after the Americans won the battle and left. Amongst
this dead, he said, “Such a tragedy. They will think this was their victory. So, this will become
an American war. And the end will be the same except for the number who will die before we
get there.” This quote emphasizes that war in general wastes human life.
Even though the movie glorifies the Vietnam War, the director still manages to critique it.
The Americans never question the morality of the war, yet Moore shows guilt for his men that
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died while he survived the battle. The killing of the Vietnamese is never critiqued though. Also,
the director highlights the memory of soldiers fighting the war with one arm tied behind their
backs. The director demonstrates this by the abandonment of the mountain after successfully
winning the battle, thus giving it back to the enemy. Finally, at the end of the movie, the narrator
indicates that the soldiers who returned home had “no bands, no flags, and no honor guards to
welcome them home. They went to war because their country ordered them to, but in the end,
they fought for neither their country nor their flag. They fought for each other.” This quote
highlights how the dominant white memory remembers the counter-culture mistreating Vietnam
veterans after they returned home, and any wrongdoing on the soldier’s part falls on the
government and politicians.134
Further Contradictions in Memory
Philip Caputo explained about his first experience in Vietnam, “What struck me was how
beautiful Vietnam was to look at. There were just endless acres of these jade-green rice paddies
and these lovely villages inside these groves of bamboo and palm trees. And way off in the
distance, these bluish, jungled mountains… and I remember seeing this line of Vietnamese
women, or schoolgirls… They actually looked like angels came to earth or something like that.
It was really quite striking, but a little unsettling. How can a place like this, so beautiful and so
enchanting, be at war?”135 This contradiction of expectations and reality based in his sensory
experience played into multiple aspects of the Vietnam War. Out of these sensory conflicts, the
collective memory of Vietnam diverged. One may interpret their senses and memories in more
of a patriotic way, full of pride, despite witnessing the hell of war. Others may interpret the war
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as a representation of the contradictions in American society, demonstrating changes must occur
at home as well.
Contradictions frequently erupted in the collective memory of the Vietnam War. U.S.
policy did not align because politicians originally advocated for self-containment in Vietnam
before the war ever started, but the U.S. needed to intervene to do so. This contradiction sprang
more contrasting elements of the war that formed the counter-collective memory. 136 The military
further created contradictions by recording false body counts to create an illusion of victory.
Oftentimes, officers determined body counts by the MGR or “Mere Gook Rule,” which
essentially meant any Vietnamese killed, citizen or soldier, would be considered Viet Cong.
They even sometimes included livestock in the body count. This racist and ultimately
devastating method stemmed from the difficulty to locate the Viet Cong. In this way, the
absence of the sense of sight contributed to this memory. Imagine trudging through dense jungle
foliage when suddenly bullets miraculously appear out of thin air. The sight and sound of
gunfire, combined with the smell of gunpowder and blood overwhelms the senses. By the time
you prepare to fight back, the bullets stop and all that can be heard are the natural sounds of the
jungle. All you know is a Viet-Cong soldier (potentially only a few or much more) just tried to
kill you and your fellow soldiers. Many soldiers fell under the illusion that the enemy was
everywhere, almost omnipresent. After all, most engagements were ambushes that took
American troops by surprise. This thought led them to believe every Vietnamese person was the
enemy. With sensory elements that confused them, the memory developed that the Vietnamese
were inherently evil. The illusive Viet-Cong became the infamous white whale, and the
American GI’s lustily hungered to rid themselves of the beast.137

136
137

Lee, 115.
Engelhardt, 209-210, 220-221.

75

An additional contradicting element of the war for the soldiers was that to win, they had
to destroy what they “won”. This conflicted in their minds on why they fought so hard to protect
something that they destroyed. Back home, the western movie genre rapidly declined in
popularity. Western movies typically justified the mass slaughter of Indian peoples due to their
undeniable enemy qualities. The Vietnam War reversed this role because Americans began to
see themselves as the ambushers. This idea conflicted with American soldier’s thoughts because
the Viet Cong ambushed the U.S. troops frequently. To top it all off, the news outlets and
president’s contrasting images of the war caused the average citizen to lose faith in the
government, the media, and the war, which shaped one side of the conflicting collective
memory.138
Captain Paul Ebaugh, Jr. argued from his perspective that the media created bias against
Vietnam soldiers. He said the soldiers were not “the killers, rapists, and murderers that the
media profiled of troops…”139 Despite being warned of terrorist tactics used by the Viet Cong in
which Vietnamese children approached American soldiers with hidden bombs, the soldiers could
not be kept, “…from giving, taking care of, hugging, and squeezing the children.” 140 Clearly,
Ebaugh, Jr. remembered the troops that surrounded him as the opposite of how the media
portrayed them as. There is no evidence to discredit his personal claims. He admitted to burning
some villages where people committed “bad things” to them. He failed to explain any further on
what these “bad things” were or how they conducted burning the villages. He argued the media
only informed the public of the worst things that happened, which rarely happened from his point
of view. Ebaugh, Jr. demonstrates how both personal and collective memories may not be true.
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He blames the media and Hollywood for this misrepresentation. In reference to the troops he
commanded over, he mentions: “The concept of these guys is that they were politically astute,
but they weren’t. They had no real concept of politics. Their discussions were about sports and
sex. They didn’t talk about what was going on in the Senate or what the Kennedys were doing. I
didn’t either.”141 This certainly seems to be true in Ebaugh, Jr.’s case and represents others as
well; therefore, the counter-memory of Vietnam veterans as killers, rapists, etc. may be based off
of outlying events and overgeneralizations. Nonetheless, the memory remains, which means
some view the memory as true, even they base the memory off of false or dramatized events and
people.
Popular Symbols of the War
Popular culture also contributed to the collective memory of the Vietnam War. Multiple
images stimulated the American public’s visual sense that has developed their memory of the
war. According to Katherine Kinney, the image of Americans killing Americans permeates in all
stories of Vietnam. This image alludes to “what really happened” in Vietnam. The image stems
from actual accounts of friendly fire in Vietnam due to bullets, napalm, and artillery. The
Vietnam War depicted this image more so than any other before it, despite the actual occurrence
of friendly fire in previous wars.142
The popular western actor John Wayne emerged as one of many images that affected
collective memory. Vietnam soldiers and young men viewed John Wayne as the epitome of
patriotism and service to one’s country. Left-wing and the counter-culture however, criticize his
image as fake. The consistency of these criticisms has led to the image of John Wayne as a
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representation of the credibility gap between the facts and the falsehoods given by the U.S.
government. John Wayne characterized the “innocence” of the 1950’s, but the Vietnam War
showed how a veil misconstrued this innocent image. John Wayne himself possessed strong
convictions against communism, coinciding with his image both on and off the screen. His
image has been attacked by the left, much like Jane Fonda’s has been by the right. 143
Historians cite the John Wayne movie The Green Berets as the key connection between
the image of John Wayne and the Vietnam War. It made the war seem like a western. In the
movie, Viet-Cong intend to overrun Fort Dodge, so the American forces’ justify the mass
slaughter of Vietnamese (representing the Indians in westerns) that occurs later in the film. The
visual and auditory effect this had on moviegoers contributed to the conflict of the war being
seen as a just or unjust war in collective memory. Some viewed this depictions as accurate,
while others did not.144 Director’s used Wayne’s physical size to represent the power of the U.S.
His image reminded viewers of WWII and the time when American power naturally won. This
image originates from his previous work in WWII themed movies. These images affected how
young men viewed themselves going to Vietnam, particularly from the movie Sands of Iwo Jima
where Wayne is seen raising the U.S. flag. Wayne’s western movies also impacted the image of
Vietnam. Vietnam is sometimes referred to as an “Indian War”. This indicates a correlation
between the frontier wars where Americans viewed the mass slaughter of Native Americans as
acceptable and the Vietnam War where soldiers saw the Vietnamese as Indians. 145
Many Vietnam soldiers went to Vietnam thinking of themselves as John Wayne and his
triumphs in Indian country. They saw themselves as brave cowboys and the Vietnamese as
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conquerable people. However, the Vietnamese rarely retreated in the face of a slaughter, which
contradicted the role of the American from the “cowboy” to the “Indian” because in these cases
the Americans (cowboys) overwhelmed the Viet-Cong (Indians).146
One soldier, Corporal Gordon W. Huckstep, admitted that he enlisted because of the John
Wayne movies that he admired. He flew in a helicopter and fired at a single “gook” for his first
experience in Vietnam. The next day, they did the same thing at the same location. The
experience excited him because it felt just like the movies. However, on the third day, they
returned to the same spot, and the “gooks” unleashed a .50 caliber machine gun. They shot down
the helicopter, injuring all but himself and a fellow soldier. He then realized Vietnam did not
compare to the movies. Huckstep provides an example of the media falsely portraying the war to
encourage young men to enlist. That false portrayal lingers in the collective memory of
American society.147
In addition to the image of John Wayne, the image of imperialism also emerged. In most
cases throughout history, the U.S. exempted itself from being seen as imperialist from their own
point of view. This changed during the Vietnam War, and maps symbolized the change.
Examinations of maps throughout the years indicated a changing border of influence, which
hinted at imperialist actions taken by the U.S. The visual sense of seeing U.S. expansion through
maps impacted the collective memory of Vietnam because it contradicted how Americans
remembered themselves. They previously thought of themselves as helpful to others, but the
maps showed the U.S. consumed most people it encountered into its expanding empire. This
idea became more widely accepted during the Vietnam War, when people were questioning
American actions. Prior to this skepticism, the U.S. seemingly immunized itself to critiques of
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imperialism because of its narratives of duty to the world, manifest destiny, and innocence.
Also, its defeat of more apparent imperialist regimes in Nazi Germany and Japan in WWII
furthered the illusion of an anti-imperialist United States. Vietnam and the study of maps
shattered this illusion.148
An interesting image that appeared from this time concerned unfaithful women to U.S.
soldiers back home. Since women still represented a domestic life, men connected them with the
lack of support veterans received on the home front. This circumstance stems from people
seeing war as masculine and home life as feminine. The phrase used by Vietnam soldiers
(“Humping the boonies”) characterizes this dynamic relationship. Soldiers used the term to
describe when soldiers patrolled the land. The use of the word “humping”, a predominantly
masculine act, demonstrates the negative connection of women to the war.149
The image of destruction arose within the collective memory of the Vietnam War as well.
A young, naked girl running and crying down a road symbolized the image of destruction.
American air forces hit her village with napalm, which caused her clothes to burn off her body
and damage her flesh. This image represented the destruction of the war on the country of
Vietnam. It also reinforced pointlessness of the war, which engrossed much of the collective
memory. This image opened the American people up further to the idea that the U.S.
represented the “bad guy” in Vietnam, which completely contradicted the American mindset and
memory throughout its entire history. 150
A vast division among black and white citizens emerged as another symbol from
Vietnam. African-Americans historically fought in U.S. wars to earn a place in American
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society and to avoid the label of “other”. When the Civil Rights Movement and Black Power
Movement developed in the 1960’s, the exclusion of African-Americans from the “American
table” became more prominent. The obvious unequal treatment of black soldiers in Vietnam
helped spark the movement. The contradiction of fighting for a country that historically
oppressed African-Americans also played a role. These reasons contributed to the belief that
blacks were “separate” and “at war”. The image of a black man with a gun symbolized the
hypocrisy of America. At home, this image unsettled whites who saw this symbol as a threat,
despite blacks supposedly maintaining the same rights. Meanwhile, whites in Vietnam viewed
blacks with guns in Vietnam as natural. With the widespread distrust of the government, people
turned to the veterans to figure out what the war was really like, particularly the black foot
soldiers. Whites perceived blacks as naturally more in tune with the body (a correlation with
slavery), so white valued their testimonies to discover the “truth”. The idea that the black man is
more in-tune with the body implied that he was less in-tune with intellect, and it reinforced the
separate status of blacks in society. 151 Whites feared that African-American veterans were
returning from the war and planned to use their newfound guerilla skills to violently fight in the
Civil Rights Movement. As will be noted later, the implication of racism directed towards
African-Americans created a different memory of the war.152
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Chapter 4: Split Senses
The Working-Class Soldier
Understanding the background of the average Vietnam soldier will provide a more indepth analysis of their sensory experiences. Christian G. Appy asserts that, “Class, not
geography, was the crucial factor in determining which Americans fought in Vietnam.” 153 He
supports this argument by showing working-class areas experienced a higher percentage of
deaths, even if an upper-class area sent the same number of soldiers. In some cases, the death
rate was four times as high in working-class areas. Also, small towns suffered more deaths from
the war relative to total population. There was an 8% casualty rate from small towns compared
to only 2% of the total population. Race also played a factor. African-Americans at the start of
the war disproportionately died compared to their total population because officers put them in
more dangerous situations. By the end of the war, however, the casualty rate became more
proportionate. African-Americans grew up in the working-class more often than whites.
Another argument Appy posed is draft requirements were reduced to allow more working-class
citizens to be accepted. These requirements were specifically related to education. 154
General Sensory Experiences
Most of what has been described up to this point has concerned collective memory. The
sensory component has not been detailed as much; however, the remainder will alleviate that
gap. Understanding the sensory experiences of Vietnam soldiers provides clarity on why
soldiers reacted to situations in certain ways. These experiences also explain the mental trauma
that many endured. The senses are the root of collective memory, since memory is connected to

153
154

Appy, 15.
Appy, 12-14, 22, 32-33.

82

the senses. After all, people obtain memories according to how they sense the world around
them.
Upon arriving in Vietnam, John Musgrave explained, “The first thing that assaulted my
nose was the foreign smells, and watching people relieve themselves by the side of the road.
Seeing animals I’d never seen before – the big water buffaloes. It was like being on Mars
because it was totally foreign to me, but I thought… ‘Look at all those foreigners!’ and it didn’t
dawn on me for a little while that the only foreigner in that area was me.”155 Musgrave related
being in a foreign world to his senses. To him, odd smells and sights made him feel discomfort.
He felt trapped in a world of uncertainties. These strange sensory experiences made him
remember he was no longer in the United States, but instead was in a foreign land surrounded by
people who he thought wanted him dead.
In some ways, nearly all Vietnam soldiers shared certain sensory experiences. First of
all, soldiers walked everywhere, which led to constantly sore feet and an increased risk of
infection. Since Vietnam has such a wet climate, many developed trench foot, an infection of the
foot that results in bits of flesh falling off. Nearly all soldiers constantly heard the roar of
helicopters. Unfortunately, the Viet Cong also sensed the loudness of these machines, alerting
them to American presence, which allowed them to run away before the foot soldiers reached
them. Helicopters contributed to frustrations among the soldiers because soldiers struggled
finding the enemy. This fueled the racism toward the Vietnamese, which led to numerous
massacres and atrocities. Yet, it seems people in general struggle to distinguish between
atrocities and acts of war. Nonetheless, these actions led to shame, guilt, and a reluctance to talk
about their experiences.156
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Furthermore, many soldiers remember the smell of Vietnam as one of their first and most
memorable sensory experiences in Vietnam. To understand this, one must remember the climate
of Vietnam differs greatly from any climate in the U.S. It is a wet, tropical area where
temperatures easily reach into the triple digits. Combine the heat with high humidity, and the
aromas that permeated in Vietnam caused smells that the soldiers rarely encountered. For many,
soldiers found the smells associated with Vietnam as noxious and comparable to the smell of
excrement. In some cases, the soldiers connected this smell to the land and war itself, alluding to
the whole situation as detrimental. While some connected the smell to the land, others related it
to the Vietnamese people. Cultural differences and racism explain why soldiers related the smell
of excrement to the Vietnamese people. A fish sauce made with decaying fish that the
Vietnamese use exemplifies a cultural difference that most American olfactory glands disagreed
with. Despite cultural differences, many applied this smell to the people because the Americans
thought of themselves as racially superior. One soldier, W.D. Ehrhart wrote in his memoir about
the smell, “… It was awful. It permeated everything. I kept thinking ‘Jesus Christ, these people
don’t even smell like human beings.’”157 Soldiers who connected the smell of excrement with
the Vietnamese typically saw them as primitive people. This smell inherently led to the
dehumanizing of the Vietnamese in some American soldier’s eyes. Dehumanization seemingly
justified the ability to commit massacres and atrocities.158
Another soldier described his initial reaction to being in Vietnam: “When I got to Nam, it
was like black had turned into white because I was totally unprepared… You’re so scared, that
you’ll shoot at anything.”159 The way this veteran describes his fear as a visual element by
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saying black turned into white indicates his reality of the war completely changed once he
realized what the war really meant. Most soldiers faced ambushes consistently, which justifies
his fears. Out of all the larger-scale firefights, the enemy started 90% of them, while 80% had
the element of surprise. This means the soldiers needed to maintain a constant vigilance while
trekking the jungles. The fear accumulated by the guerilla tactics of the Viet Cong likely
contributed to mental health problems in some of the veterans later in life.160
Philip Caputo: An Ideal Example of the Typical Vietnam Soldier
Philip Caputo wrote one of the most valuable primary sources that demonstrates the
sensory elements of the war as well as the mental trauma that stemmed from it. Caputo, a former
marine who fought in Vietnam, wrote a book about his experiences titled A Rumor of War. In
the opening pages, he admitted to having mental trauma after returning from Vietnam. He
acknowledged that most combat veterans shared similar experiences like himself after returning
home: “an inability to concentrate, a child-like fear of darkness, a tendency to tire easily, chronic
nightmares, an intolerance to loud noises – especially doors slamming and cars backfiring – and
alternating moods of depression and rage that came over me for no apparent reason.” 161 He
indicated these symptoms of war had not completely subsided. This quote adequately
summarizes what many veterans likely experienced when they returned from war. The sensory
elements are clear (fear of the dark and agitation over loud noises) as well, which characterizes
the connection of senses to mental trauma. The fear of the dark likely comes from the inability
to see the enemy as well as shots fired at night. Loud noises caused him to reminisce on shots
fired and loud explosions, which he associated with danger.
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Prior to going to the war, Caputo described seeing propaganda posters, which encouraged
him to enlist. This visual experience of seeing a heroic soldier convinced him that to cure his
“dull” suburban life, he needed to enlist. Caputo envisioned himself as the soldier on the poster,
and he knew he wanted to save the day like that man. Propaganda clearly played an important
role in initiating the early stages of soldiery. It allowed Caputo and others like him to visualize
themselves as the heroic soldier. As the scholarship indicates, Caputo imagined himself as John
Wayne. The image of John Wayne stuck in Caputo’s mind, much like most Vietnam soldiers.
The propaganda phrase, “The Marine corps Builds Men” also convinced Caputo to fight because
at the age of nineteen, he felt like he need to prove his manhood. This indicates a collective
memory that war is manly and admirable. His initial sensory experience involving the
propaganda poster reflects the white dominant memory of America. This memory changed for
Caputo and embraced more of the counter-memory after he realized this image strayed from the
truth.162
Caputo realized shortly after arriving in Vietnam that the war occurred mostly at night.
Soldiers oftentimes fought in nocturnal situations. He recalled enemy snipers firing regularly
about every thirty minutes on their camps, although quite inaccurately.

He explained the

random shots fired made the men nervous to where they started mistaking bushes for men. Night
also caused an increased chance allies shooting fellow soldiers. Caputo indicated the soldiers he
fought with almost shot him on multiple occasions. This explains his and many other soldier’s
fears of the dark after the war. The absence of light (and therefore a limited visual sense)
combined with the constant threat and fear of an enemy attack created the mental disturbance of
fearing the dark.163
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Within Caputo’s first few nights, he realized another sensory aspect that prominently
impacted his time in Vietnam: insect bites. Mosquito netting and insect spray worked poorly,
causing insects to easily bite Caputo and others. He experienced insect bites so much that “my
face and hands were masses of welts.”164 Insect bites certainly played a role in the tactile sense
in the form of pain and irritation. Along with insect bites came disease. Malaria was present,
but the military dispersed pills to ward off the disease. These bitter-tasting pills caused
everyone’s skin to turn into yellowish hue. Filth also contributed to disease. Unsanitary
conditions made diarrhea and dysentery an almost universal constant. Coupled with few bathing
opportunities and unclean water which also caused diarrhea, the stench of excrement
characterized soldier life regarding smell. In fact, Caputo ranked the smell of feces as the most
prominent smell he associated with Vietnam.165
An aspect not normally recognized regarding the sensory experience of Vietnam involves
dust. Since Vietnam is tropical, one typically disregards dust as an elemental threat; however,
during the dry season, dust can be extremely prominent. Once again, Caputo provided an
intuitive account of dust and climate in Vietnam through the senses. Wind picked up dust from
roads and already harvested fields of rice paddies. At times, the dust became so dense that
clouds formed. After it settled, the dust entrenched everything. In extreme cases, soldiers failed
to escape eating and drinking dust because it infiltrated their food and water supplies. Dust
caked their lungs since they breathed so much of it in. After the wind settled and the sun rose,
the heat of Vietnam caused excessive sweating, making the dust that settled on the soldier’s skin
turn into a grimy coating. Heat played another role as well. Soldiers commonly experienced
heat exhaustion and dehydration, and men sometimes died from it. Couple all of this with the
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unpleasant experiences at night and one realizes the typical Vietnam soldier’s constant misery. 166
This misery contributed to the anti-war movement that some veterans returned home and
participated in. They remembered their negative sensory experiences and used it to fuel their
rhetoric denouncing the war. These denouncements, rooted in their sensory experiences in
Vietnam, contributed to a stronger counter collective memory.
Swamps riddle some areas of Vietnam. In cases where Caputo traversed this kind of
landscape, he recalled many sensory elements. First of all, the swamps contained large amounts
of mud that tugged at his boots; therefore, the suction from the mud made it more difficult to
walk. Breaking the surface of the mud and rotting vegetation allowed putrid gases to escape,
overwhelming his sense of smell. To top it all off, leeches would often attach themselves to the
soldier’s bodies, sucking their blood for nutrition. He compares walking through this landscape
to a sewer.167
Caputo ranked when he witnessed his platoon turn from a disciplined group of men to
borderline arsonists as his worst sight. This occurred when they stormed a village. After air
craft dropped napalm, and some Vietnamese lay dead, the men lost control, burning everything
in sight. Caputo attributed this loss of control and humanity to built-up fear, frustration, and
tension. After the event, they humanized again, a process resulting in shame and guilt for their
actions. He estimated they burned down the homes of two hundred people.168
Caputo spent some time as a casualty reporter. This experience also reveals interesting
sensory elements that many soldiers shared. While describing this experience, he noted the
repugnant smell of death. He acknowledged that regardless of race, the dead smelled the same.
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He compared human death to animal death and concluded human death smells worse. He
described the difficulty in acclimating oneself to the smell of death as nearly impossible. He
found the potent smell of death to be unbearable, unlike the sight of death. Caputo’s account
implies that the sense of smell impacts memory more than the sense of sight, at least concerning
death. Caputo’s mental health also deteriorated as a casualty reporter. He started visualizing the
people around him as dead, including himself. It got so intense that he hallucinated two living
men as walking dead men. These hallucinations caused him to fear insanity. Having time to
think about the war and his situation caused him to react this way. Fearing insanity, he requested
to go back into the field.169
Caputo, like many others, expected the Vietnamese citizens to admire him and celebrate
their own liberation by America. Instead, the Vietnamese gave him apathetic stares. He recalled
it seemed like the citizens showed no emotion towards the Americans, even if the soldiers burned
their houses down. For this apathy, Caputo began to hate them. He struggled caring for people
who he seemingly saw as indifferent to their own plight. He later realized the Vietnamese
adapted to war in this way to survive. After all, they experienced foreign invasion and military
presence throughout most of their living memory. Caputo’s feelings toward the enemy aligns
with what historians say about soldier’s feelings towards the Vietnamese. He felt conflicted. He
wanted to dehumanize them to justify his actions, but when finding pictures of the Viet Cong’s
families, that made it difficult to not see them like himself. He also felt admiration for their
willingness to fight and live in an area he basically saw as hell, yet he viewed them as the
undeniable enemy who seemingly lacked the right to live.170
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The last of Caputo’s experiences to be described is one in which he was on a three day
leave of R & R. In these three days, he found reason to continue living. He found this in the
senses of Saigon, a place still mostly civilized compared to the jungles where death lurked
around the next tree. He rediscovered the desire in the relaxing and liberating feel of a shower.
He found it in a menu where he chose what he tasted. He found it in hearing the laughter of a
man nearby, which gave him a feeling of normalcy. He found it in a bottle of wine, where the
feel and look of the condensation on the bottle made him feel happy. This demonstrates that
while the senses of war stripped him of humanity, the senses of civilization revived his humanity
again.171 War and the senses impacted soldiers’ actions, but civilization revitalized their sense of
humanity. When this occurred, soldiers faced the daunting task of coping with their unspeakable
actions.
In Their Own Words: Vietnam in General
While much attention has been focused on Philip Caputo because he provided a great
base of sensory experiences, others provide sensory accounts valuable in the analysis of sensory
experiences. In a letter by Richard Elliott to his family, he wrote about the hatred he felt towards
the Vietnamese after finding out they killed two men. He wrote, “Dad, now more than ever I am
determined to do everything possible to wipe these rotten bastards off the face of the earth…
heaven help anyone of them, man, woman, or child, that crosses my path. Total and complete
destruction is the only way to treat these animals. I never thought I could hate as much as I do
now.”172 These words symbolize the racist hatred many soldiers felt. Specifically addressing his
father in this part of the letter indicates a desire to impress him and make him proud. Elliott tries
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to prove his bravery that the older generations rejected. This feeling of hatred based off dead
comrades partially explains the atrocities that occurred.
Contradicting the letter written by Richard Elliott, William P. Twiggs wrote a letter to his
family acknowledging sympathy towards the Vietnamese people. He explained the Vietnamese
people actually admired the American soldiers because they viewed them as liberators. An
interesting sentence from the letter contradicts most of the scholarship about Vietnam. Twiggs
wrote, “… we take our freedom for granted, and we have never had our homes and cities and
states bombed or invaded by unfriendly forces who take anything they want and then kill just for
the sake of it.”173 This quote is intriguing because the scholarship supports the idea that the U.S.
did not see themselves as invaders, but Twiggs clearly did. Incidents like My Lai exemplify
Americans killing “just for the sake of it.” This letter represents the conflicting ideas that
encompassed the Vietnam War. It also exemplifies how these conflicting ideas, perceptions,
viewpoints, and experiences led to a complex collective memory of Vietnam that fragmented due
to the various sensory stimuli that the American population experienced.
Two letters, one written by an anonymous soldier that a senator censored to the keep the
writer’s identity private and the other by Carl D. Rodgers to his church back home, reveal a
contrast in the way the media portrayed the war prior to 1967. In the anonymous letter addressed
to a person named Chris, the writer claimed the media inaccurately portrayed the events in
Vietnam. The writer indicated media photographers staged the combat photos and others. The
writer advised Chris to not believe what the journalists and pictures conveyed.174 Rodgers
supported these claims in a living letter, which is a tape-recorded message. Rodgers asked a
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reporter if he thought the American people were misinformed. The reporter responded he did not
think so, but journalists had to “add originality” to their story to appear different from their
competing networks, thus implying some of the information could stray from the original. The
reporter acknowledged that leaders in media placed journalists under strict regulations to portray
the war in a positive light because their bosses threatened to revoke their license.175 Rodger’s
letter shows the contrast of the media at the start of U.S. involvement to the end in which the
media gained more critical freedom. Soldiers who wrote letters like these and sent them back
home conflicted with the media’s portrayal. Who was to be believed? These letters exemplify
further the contradictions that split the collective memory between those who supported the war
and those who protested it.
In letters written to his parents, PFC Clifford P. Combs desired his family to send him
various items. As expected, he requested that numerous members of his family send him letters.
In addition to letters, he asked his parents to send him cookies and candy. This reveals his
attempts to reconnect with home and his own culture. Through the desire to taste, Combs
demonstrated a clear difference between American and Vietnamese culture by showing
American’s well-known palate for sweet, sugary food. While this difference may seem
insignificant, it undoubtedly reminded soldiers that they fought in a foreign land far from home,
removed from the society and culture that they cherished. For those lucky enough to return
home, the foreignness of the Vietnam War sometimes overwhelmed them, leading to their public
demonstrations, which as already mentioned impacted the collective memory. 176
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Combs continued throughout his brief letters and frequently informed his parents of the
weather conditions in Vietnam. He noted that he experienced more heat an rain in Vietnam. He
said it was not unbearable, “just enough to make you mad.” 177 Combs further acknowledged his
lack of cleanliness. He joked that he could bathe in a month after he wrote one of his letters. He
acknowledged that his family could see his filth by the apparent condition of his letter,
explaining dirt settled on the page. Couple this with having to sleep on the ground every night,
and it becomes apparent that he certainly no longer lived as comfortably as he used to at home.
While this may be obvious and expected, it hints at an increased irritability among the soldiers
due to their uncomfortable sensory experiences.178
One notices Combs’ feelings of loneliness most often in his letters. Throughout his
writings, he constantly requested his family to write to him because the letters helped him not be
so bored and lonely. In his last letter he wrote, “We are sitting up on a great big hill overlooking
a valley and it sure is pretty. It is as green as the day is long. Just like summer at home. But it
sure is not home.”179 Despite the similar imagery of home, Combs failed to escape the thought
that he currently lived in a different culture and an alternate sensory world. Unfortunately,
Combs died two days after he wrote this letter after bleeding to death from a gunshot wound to
his legs.180
Captain Paul Ebaugh, Jr., mentioned in chapter three, also remembered a sensory
experience that helped him connect with home. His experience happened on Christmas Eve
where he found himself in a hole with four other men. They all whispered the song “Silent
Night,” despite their perilous situation. Ebaugh, Jr. stated he still could not sing that song due to
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that memory because none of the other men survived the war. This sensory experience of the
auditory song helped bring the men back home, at least metaphorically. The song served as a
passage back to their Christian roots and memories of Christmas in the United States. 181
In Their Own Words: African-American Soldiers
African-American soldiers fit into both categories of supporters and non-supporters of the
war in a unique way as a result of the ongoing Civil Rights Movement back home; therefore,
much of their experiences have much to do with racial differences. The majority of sources for
this demographic come from oral histories in Wallace Terry’s book titled Bloods. Terry notes in
the introduction that by 1969, a different type of black fought in Vietnam compared to the
beginning, in which most were professional soldiers who proudly fought in the military.
However, in 1969, the new blacks were draftees, many of whom participated in the Civil Rights
Movement and were proud of their black background. Advocating for black soldiers to fight
together on the battlefield, they called themselves “bloods”. By this time, black and white
American soldiers had conflicts amongst each other, causing disunity and a different experience
for each race. Bloods went to the war anticipating a better life when they returned home for
providing services to their country, but whites actually treated them even worse. The majority of
the testimonies by African-American Vietnam veterans revealed a focus on racism towards them
while serving. This racism caused their narratives of the war to differ than those of whites. For
example, many resisted showing racist thoughts towards the Vietnamese because they knew
racism negatively impacts relationships. Differences like this created alternate memories, which
led African-Americans to have conflicting memories compared to their white counterparts.
Nonetheless, they shared similar experiences, which resulted in similar mental traumas. This
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dynamic of different memory, but similar experiences and mental struggles connects to the
complex and contradictory elements that has created a conflicting collective memory. 182
Before these men’s stories are told, Lieutenant Ray Fulkerson’s perspective brings forth
an interesting possibility. As an officer, Fulkerson worried more about morale, giving him a
different perspective than most of his fellow soldiers. It should be noted that Fulkerson was a
white man. His company originally fought in the northern part of allied territory in Vietnam,
where booby traps and sniper fire commonly threatened their lives. In other words, they
constantly relied on each other to survive, regardless of racial differences. Eventually, his
company moved more south, further from the front. South of the front, they found themselves
with more luxuries like air conditioning, hot meals, and dry sleeping environments. Despite
these wartime luxuries, morale worsened because the Viet Cong constantly attacked then
retreated into the villages, where higher officers restricted the U.S. soldiers ability to call in a fire
mission. This meant high casualties with no opportunity for retribution. As a result, Fulkerson
noted that relationships between white and black soldiers deteriorated out of this frustration.
Since they could not take out their frustrations on the Viet Cong and no longer fully depended on
each other, they resorted to taking out their frustrations on one another. Fulkerson recalled when
black troops met each other on truck convoys, they raised their fist, symbolizing black power.
Also, some black soldiers refused to go out on patrol. He said that kind of division between
white and black soldiers never occurred further north. This indicates that morale may have had
an effect on race relations. This could explain why some black soldiers perceived the war
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differently than others. Those in higher morale situations likely developed better relationships
with their white counterparts. Conversely, those in lower morale situations likely did not.183
Interestingly, Fulkerson remembered going to Washington D.C. and people spat at him
and shouted verbal abuse. This turned him away from pursuing a career in the military. He
noted racial tension expanded at the time of his return from Vietnam. He even recalled a
lynching of a white man. His account indicates that racial violence occurred from both races
back home, which most fail to remember today. Nonetheless, Fulkerson did not indicate in his
interview with Harry Spiller any ill will or prejudice towards African-Americans. Still,
memories like this contribute to the split memory among races. 184
An oral history by Reginald “Malik” Edwards highlighted the racism inherent in the
Vietnam War. He explained how he experienced racism in boot camp. He provides the
examples of being called a “chocolate bunny”, “brillo head”, and a “nigger”. Despite the
prejudice toward blacks in America, Edwards still saw himself as an American, so he still
proudly fought for the U.S. He also explained that black men died first in each battalion of the
9th Marines due to friendly fire. After Edwards made his first kill, the smell and feel of the rain
made him realize he killed an actual human being who had a family; he no longer saw him just
as a “gook”. The sensory experience of rain seemingly gave him clarity of his actions, which
made him feel guilty. Edwards eventually got in trouble for being involved in a riot on base,
which began over a fight between white men using profanity around black women. Edwards
went to jail, at which he punched a duty warden, resulting in his dishonorable discharge from the
Marines. As a result, he joined the Black Panthers. By doing this organization, he felt he “had
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left one war and came back and got into another one.”185 He viewed Vietnam as the white man’s
war, due to all of the Confederate flags he saw amongst white soldiers. He also revealed
sympathy for the Vietnamese, especially concerning My Lai. Edwards’ account reveals two
aspects of his experience that most white Vietnam soldiers rarely talked about: racism and regret.
White people clearly discriminated against Edwards based on the visual sense: the sight of his
black skin. He also showed sympathy towards the Vietnamese because he related to their plight
due to the racism he experienced within his own country.186
Emmanuel J. Holloman shared similar views with Edwards. He stated, “I think blacks
got along better with the Vietnamese people because they knew the hardships the Vietnamese
went through.”187 He noted that he understood the poverty of the Vietnamese because he came
from a background of poverty. Most of the white people did not, so they struggled connecting
with the Vietnamese. He also said blacks tried to comprehend their culture, language, and
customs more than the whites. They did this to better understand the people to avoid offending
them. Holloman’s oral history explains why many blacks had a different mindset and memory of
Vietnam: they understood the plight of the Vietnamese because they shared similar experiences
back in the U.S. Whites struggled wrapping their minds around this concept, granted many did
not try to.188
Harold “Light Bulb” Bryant also provided valuable information on the African-American
experience. In his testimony, he acknowledged the symbol of John Wayne. He described a
young white soldier who came over to Vietnam for the sole purpose of killing Vietnamese as “a
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typical John Wayne complex.”189 This soldier died trying to do an act of heroism like John
Wayne. This reveals how the John Wayne image resulted in some men dying, and it shows that
the imaged affected African-Americans much less. Vietnam also helped Bryant realize that
whites put off a false perception back home: as the best, toughest, and humane race. In fact, he
viewed whites as more cowardly and animalistic than any blacks he knew. Bryant’s account
highlighted a stronger emphasis on race relations. When describing animalistic and brutal
actions, Bryant always indicated white men performed these acts. For example, he explained the
mutilation of dead Viet Cong (such as cutting off ears and in one case a penis) as always being
done by white men. He explained these types of actions occurred frequently. He also described
the stench of the ears that white men cut off because some kept them as trophies. Bryant
expressed disgust to these actions.190
According to Bryant, Vietnamese treated blacks better than whites. He explained the
Vietnamese held Buddha, a central figure in Vietnamese life, as a black person. This, along with
their own experiences, explains why blacks expressed less racism towards the Vietnamese.
Despite a different mindset, Bryant failed to escape the detrimental mental effects caused by the
war from his sensory experiences. After returning home, he dreamed nightmares and
hallucinated imagined events. In Bryant’s case, race did not matter when it came to the mental
impact of the war. His account shows that while differences exist between white and black
experiences, similarities remain as well, especially regarding mental trauma.191
Richard J. Ford provided more information regarding the mental trauma he endured from
Vietnam. Initially, he struggled sleeping. He would wake up halfway through the night and see
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trees outside his parent’s house. He envisioned these trees transported him back to Vietnam. In
this illusion, Ford searched for his weapon and fellow soldiers, but he obviously failed to do so.
This experience highlights mental trauma. In this case, Ford traced this trauma to losing his
friend, Davis. Ford acknowledged his struggle to disconnect from Vietnam. On the Fourth of
July, fire crackers triggered this illusion again, and he fired a warning shot at kids with his .22
pistol. Furthermore, four white, drunk men cut him off while driving and honked their horn at
him. With his mother and wife in the car, he forgot about them and imagined himself back in
Vietnam. He chased the white men, firing gunshots at their car. Ford exemplifies a Vietnam
veteran who experienced flashbacks through noise. On the Fourth of July, firecrackers triggered
his break from reality. When he chased the men who cut him off in traffic, the car horn sent him
into the illusion. Clearly the sense of hearing ties into memory and mental trauma.192
Charles Strong, already mentioned earlier when describing the Tet Offensive, also
experienced flashbacks. For him, heavy rain triggered this kind of experience. The smell, sight,
sound, and feel of it initiated the flashback. When this happened, he put his combat boots on and
wandered around his town like he was in combat. He broke out street lamps during these
flashbacks. In Strong’s case, the sensation of rain sparked his mental trauma, indicating
alternative memories and senses not related to combat triggers mental episodes.193
The testimony of Norman Alexander McDaniel, a POW in the Vietnam War, described
many his sensory experiences while imprisoned as a POW. When it came to taste, he ate little
amounts of often spoiled food. For example, the bread grew mold and the thumb-sized amount
of pig fat usually contained bits of hair. McDaniel ate it anyway, knowing his survival depended
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on it. He still slept hungry every night and lost about thirty-five pounds. Some who refused to
eat became “like skeletons” because some dropped ninety pounds in weight. For touch, he
explained the winter months blasted him with cold, and his captors provided little clothing to
keep warm. Their captors limited their movements too, so McDaniel’s legs swelled, causing
pain and itching. Prisoners were not allowed to communicate with each other, so they formed a
way of communication by using a series of taps. Talking oftentimes led to torture. When it
came to sanitation, the Viet-Cong gave them homemade bars of soap and a tube of toothpaste
that had to last for at least four months. When bathing or washing clothes, they had ten minutes
in ice-cold water to do so. For excretory purposes, they relied on a bucket that could be emptied
once a day. If a prisoner was uncooperative, they waited until the next day to empty their
bucket. Needless to say, McDaniel lived in unsanitary conditions, meaning the smells he
experienced would not be pleasant. Although, that was not the worst of his problems by any
means (after all, the enemy held him as prisoner). McDaniel interestingly never indicated
suffering any mental trauma from the experience in his story, unlike many POW’s mentioned
earlier during the Korean War. He attributed his resiliency to his faith in God and his increased
religious conviction from his experience.194
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Conclusion
Connection to Today
While there are still plenty of Vietnam veterans alive today in the United States, perhaps
more people today connect more with the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, the
Vietnam War shares many similarities to the wars in those two respective countries, both from a
sensory and collective memory perspective. Granted, it must be acknowledged that it might be
far too early to establish this connection. Future historians must research the topic to discover if
any sense of truth lies in the connection.
C.J. Chivers notes in the preface of his book The Fighters: Americans in Combat in
Afghanistan and Iraq that the men he studied eagerly looked forward to war, but they resorted to
searching for answers for the needless casualties of women and children. He explains, “Many of
them wanted then, and still want now, to connect their battlefield service to something greater
than a memory reel of gunfights, explosions, and grievous wounds. They wanted to understand
accidental killings as isolated mistakes in a campaign characterized by sound strategy, moral
authority, and lasting success.”195 This description sounds eerily similar to Vietnam soldiers’
experiences that have been highlighted throughout this paper. Soldiers of the Afghanistan and
Iraq Wars after 9/11 faced similar moral dilemmas that American soldiers experienced in the
Vietnam War. Unfortunately, it is too early to tell what effects this will have. It is unclear if the
course of events in Iraq and Afghanistan will or has followed a similar trajectory, but the
information currently available suggests that it has.
Similarities Between Vietnam and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
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Chivers details various accounts of Afghanistan/Iraq soldiers in his book already
mentioned in the paragraph above. He provides their own personal experiences and
interpretations of the war. These accounts share a similar narrative to those of Vietnam soldiers:
immoral actions, an initial intense motivation to fight (only to be disappointed in unnecessary
violence), and above all a struggle to find purpose in the war. These are just some general
similarities, but there are more specific ones as well.
Another shared characteristic of the two wars a large amount of Americans view both
wars as failures to “correct” foreign affairs. Similar to the Vietnam War, the government stated
they wanted to defend the United States from terrorism (in Vietnam it was to defend against
communism), yet these stated purposes contradicted with the actual actions taken. In addition to
misconstrued purposes, the public saw the enemy of both wars as a radical group. In Vietnam, it
was the communistic Viet-Cong, while in Afghanistan and Iraq Muslim groups such as al-Qaeda
and more recently ISIS are seen as radical. Despite these distinguished groups labeled as the
enemy, the soldiers target people in general in those areas. Soldiers target Muslims in the
Middle East and some citizens target them for harassment at home. The government also state
the intention to spread democracy and set up self-sustaining governments. The enemy in the
Middle East used guerilla warfare, which made it difficult to identify them because they blended
in with non-combatants. In both scenarios, this caused some soldiers to develop racist attitudes
towards Vietnamese and people in the Middle East. Some of the veterans of both eras feel
betrayed by their government due to misleading intentions, which left some with a bitter
resentment to the United States and its leaders. 196
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A bug continually pestered Afghanistan/Iraq War soldiers similarly to Vietnam soldiers
who struggled against mosquitoes. In Afghanistan and Iraq, soldiers resist sand flies. Sand flies
sucked blood from their victims, which Vietnam veterans certainly knew the struggle that a bug
like that caused. Additionally, soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq dealt with an intense amount of
mud and dust, making the touch of their skin feel grimy and chalky, while also occasionally
causing a difficulty to see, thus affecting their visual sense. 197
An example of disapproval of the Iraq War within the United States, similarly to the
Vietnam era, came from Natalie Maines, the lead singer of the country band Dixie Chicks.
Granted, she aimed her disapproval more at President Bush, the band clearly did not support the
war either. The Dixie Chicks band met disapproval by certain segments of the American public,
which caused them to stop producing music.198 Their recent resurgence and popularity suggests
that a split has in fact occurred in the collective memory of the Iraq War.
The Dixie Chicks’ stance on the war contradicted with how Alan Jackson, a fellow
country music singer-songwriter, felt about it. His song “Where Were You (When the World
Stopped Turning)” played to the emotional aspects of 9/11. Its apolitical stance resonated with
audiences and critics alike, earning him his first Grammy Award for Best Country Song in
2002.199 The success of this song and the absence of a political statement indicates most people
felt the same way. This stance meant the collective memory could either develop into a positive
one or a negative one. The reemergence of the Dixie Chicks hints that it is emerging to be more
of a negative one, but there certainly seems to be many who still believe nationalities from where
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the terrorists came from need to be punished for their actions (which is typically and falsely
lumped together into “the Middle East”), as evidenced by America’s long-term involvement in
the area. This support for a continued presence in the Middle East remained even after a Navy
team killed Osama Bin Ladin, the lead orchestrator of the 9/11 attack, in 2011. The split in this
form of media correlates with how media affected the split in memory of the Vietnam War,
meaning war that resulted from 9/11 resulted in a similarly split remembrance.
Americans initially collectively thought of the war in the Middle East as justified due to
the 9/11 attack. People later remembered the war as unjustified because they saw it as a way for
the United States to extract oil from the abundant deposits in the Middle East. The two
memories still remain in the collective memory. However, one side may eventually be forgotten.
The reemergence of the Dixie Chicks suggests the memory of the Iraq War as unjustified will be
remembered, but a possibility still remains that both may continue similarly to the collective
memory of the Vietnam War. In many ways, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are identical to
the wars in Korea and Vietnam, but with more modern elements. By now, it should be clear that
these wars have much in common when it comes to the general purposes and contradictions
noticed by the soldiers. More detailed accounts of individual soldiers who fought in Afghanistan
or Iraq will further strengthen this connection.
Individual Soldier Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq
Lieutenant Layne McDowell thought war in the Middle East would end quickly due to
the effectiveness of air raids. This was only one of many misconceptions that McDowell would
have throughout his service. McDowell worked as a pilot and viewed aircraft fighting as moral
because everyone involved willingly participated. This view started to change when he started
conducting bombing assignments near residential buildings. In one case, McDowell missed his
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target and hit a civilian house. This caused him great distress because he struggled with the
thought of killing innocent people. He reflected on his possible killing of innocents and later
thought the U.S. failed to place value on the potential loss of those innocent lives because no one
attempted to find out what happened with that poorly aimed bomb. McDowell further solidified
this thought in his mind because he never experienced any attempts to prevent similar
occurrences from happening again. McDowell dreamed he found his own son with the back of
his skull missing in the house he blew up. This suggests the event caused McDowell mental
trauma. McDowell’s story provides an example of a moral dilemma faced by an American
soldier in the Middle East as a result of contradicting government intentions, which many
Vietnam soldiers felt as well.200
The story of Sergeant First Class Leo Kryszewski also sheds light on some similarities
between the wars in the Middle East and Vietnam. Kryszewski remembered watching video
from the Gulf War on television and thinking he should partake in that glory. This encouraged
him to fight in the Iraq War. This part of his story relates to Vietnam veterans who were drawn
to fight in Vietnam after being encouraged by the glory depicted in movies that World War II
veterans enjoyed. This also shows similar roles of television and the sense of sight in the
recruitment process of American soldiers.201
Kryszewski had additional similar experiences like Vietnam soldiers. Kryszewski
remembered that he frequently experienced the threat of incoming missiles and the sounds of
them exploding. Rarely would they actually harm people, but it still caused many in the base to
feel paranoid. This connects to Vietnam soldiers who experienced the sound of enemy sniper
fire on their camps, which also caused them to feel paranoid. Eventually, a rocket injured
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Kryszewski. He later recollected an interesting sensory experience: “Hearing a whistling shell, a
screaming rocket, or a snapping bullet means that you have been missed.” 202 In this way, the
sense of hearing often indicated one’s personal safety in some regards. He noted how the lethal
projectile does not announce itself until it is too late because one does not hear it after it hits
them. Finally, Kryszewski also had an experience where he returned home and encountered
disapproval from people in the United States once they found out he fought in the war. Similar
experiences by Vietnam (and Korean) veterans made them feel like the American public and
government did not validate their experiences. If the U.S. populace is not careful,
Afghanistan/Iraq war veterans may feel that way too.203
Hospital Corpsman Dustin E. Kirby had images of Marvel superheroes (Captain America
being one of them) in his head, which inspired him to be a hero himself. His grandfather, who
served in World War II, inspired him to fight. This inspiration shows media (in the form of
comic book heroes) and World War II glory also affected some soldiers’ desires to fight in the
Middle East, much like how John Wayne inspired Vietnam soldiers. After all, Vietnam soldiers’
saw John Wayne and the characters he portrayed as their superhero. In this way, an argument
could be made that victory culture has not ended like Tom Engelhardt suggests, rather it has
evolved into a different form that has not yet been adequately identified. Instead of the Native
American or the Communist, Americans view Muslims as the demographic to defeat.204
In addition to superhero influences, Kirby encountered citizens who resisted American
protection, much like many of the Vietnamese. This of course contradicted with the U.S. goal to
protect the citizens. Citizens, including children, seemingly betrayed the American soldiers and
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tricked them into danger, which caused the soldiers to not trust the citizens. Vietnam soldiers
reflected this mistrust, which partially contributed to atrocities like the My Lai Massacre. It is
important to remember that the public did not learn of the My Lai Massacre until much later in
the Vietnam War, which indicates soldiers may not report atrocities concerning the
Afghanistan/Iraq Wars. Only time will tell if this comparison is accurate.205
Kirby, like the other individuals already mentioned, experienced contradictions in his
time fighting in the Middle East. He always dreamed of saving someone’s life. He ended up
helping one of his best friends stay alive long enough for a helicopter to race him to a hospital;
however, he felt contradicting emotions because the enemy shot his friend through the head.
Upon examining the blood and bits of brain his friend left behind, Kirby’s “saving” actions felt
selfish because he thought his friend’s life would lose worth if he survived. This contradictory
experience spurred on by the sensory experience of seeing blood and bits of his friend’s brain is
similar to sensory experiences that Vietnam soldiers had, which caused mental trauma. 206
Perhaps the most negative response can be found in Specialist Robert Soto’s sections of
Chivers’ book. Soto, like many soldiers involved in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, was
encouraged to join the military after 9/11. Soto acknowledged that his experiences did not align
with how both President Bush and President Obama and how their respective administrations
portrayed the war. He detested the wars for all of the unnecessary violence and how soldiers
suspected the citizens in Afghanistan and Iraq of helping the enemy. He envisioned the Taliban
as ghosts due to their practice of guerilla warfare because he could not see them (a similar
viewpoint shared by Vietnam soldiers of the elusive Viet-Cong). Soto fought in the mountainous
region of Afghanistan, which is somewhat unique compared to the typical soldier’s experience in
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Afghanistan because soldiers fought in the mountainous regions much more than other soldiers
since guerilla fighters hid in the mountains. Like many Vietnam soldiers, Soto felt the
government restricted his platoon to carry out their objectives. Also, when he went back home
on emergency leave due to his half-sister’s death, he noticed the contrasting state of other
soldiers compared to himself. The soldiers were clean, well-fed, and relatively content, unlike
himself. This similarly contrasts with Vietnam soldiers who viewed new recruits in a similar
way. Eventually, Soto’s wanted only to ensure his comrades’ safety.207
Lieutenant Jarrod Neff, who actually witnessed an atrocity first-hand, provides the final
story. He and his squad were told to check out a house that rockets destroyed. When he and
another soldier examined the ruins, they discovered mostly women and children resided in the
house. Due to their military ranks, they lacked authority to call in the rockets or investigate
further. The elderly man who owned the house and survived the rocket explosions blamed Neff
and his men for the death of his family. Neff and his troops had no answer for the man.
Unfortunately, Neff could only carry on with his mission. Neff’s story begs the question: how
many more events like this have occurred and gone unreported?208
The similar sensory experiences of these soldiers in comparison to Vietnam soldiers
points to the possibility that they will have relatable experiences moving forward in their lives
(mental and physical trauma, rejection by people back home, drug problems, and a struggle to
cope with the actions that they have done). From a collective memory perspective, the conflicts
in the Middle East are shaping memories in a similar fashion to the conflict in Vietnam: split. A
major repercussion for split memory seems to be a break in cultural identity due to alternate
perspectives of the society’s past. This creates conflict amongst the citizens and scholars who try
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to remember the events. For Vietnam, the split memory caused an identity crisis, particularly
among white citizens because they started to question their “good guy” identity (whereas
African-Americans have never accepted this viewpoint due to racism that many experienced).
The split memory that may develop out of the conflict in the Middle East may further disrupt the
WASP identity, particularly when it comes to Christian identity (considering the conflict can be
considered one between a Christian society and a Muslim one). Historians need to determine if
similar splits in memory have occurred in America’s past.
Closing Remarks
A North Vietnamese soldier by the name of Bao Ninh said in Ken Burns’ Vietnam War
documentary, “It has been forty years. Even the Vietnamese veterans, we avoid talking about the
war. People sing about victory, about liberation. They’re wrong. Who won and who lost is not
a question. In war, no one wins or loses. There is only destruction. Only those who have never
fought like to argue about who won and who lost.”209 Ninh’s perspective highlights the
complexity of the Vietnam War and why it is impossible to simplify it. The dominant and
counter-memory both attempt to do this, with neither completely succeeding to do so. For this
reason, both versions of the memories of the war hold truths and falsehoods.
The author recognizes that missing pieces exist in this narrative and still much more work
remains. Further research can be done in multiple areas by future historians who wish to take up
the mantle of sensory history and collective memory concerning the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
What has been provided here should act as a foundation for others to improve and expand on.
Areas that could be explored further include the effects of sensory history from World War II
and its effects in relation to collective memory of Vietnam, other minority demographic sensory
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experiences and memories (such as Asian-American, Latin American, and women), and more
analysis of cinematography (especially television shows and documentaries). For any future
researcher, these are the author’s suggestions for furthering this work and adding to what is
already established here. The purpose of this work was to create a foundation for others to
absorb and make their own contributions to the sensory history and collective memory of the
Vietnam War. The hope of the author is that what is provided establishes an adequate
foundation, one in which improvement is always possible.
In conclusion, the collective memory of the Vietnam War has been split in multiple ways.
The counter-memory remembers it as an unjust war that displayed the worst in America. This
memory spread from minority groups (especially African-Americans) to white Americans. The
dominant white memory remembers the war as an unnecessary war, but once the U.S. committed
to it, the government held the soldiers back, and the public treated veterans poorly. This split is
still too simplified, as showcased by the experiences of African-American soldiers, who fell
somewhere in between both of these portions of collective memory due to the conflict of racism
and fighting in support of a country that inherently advocated for that racism. Regardless, the
collective memories in every portion stemmed from previous wars, especially the “forgotten”
Korean War. Soldiers in Korea had similar sensory experiences, but the U.S. failed to learn the
lessons from that war, turning Vietnam into an even stronger sensory experience. This made the
Vietnam War unforgettable, unlike the Korean War. The events of the Vietnam War also altered
the collective memory of it. Spurred by mediums in the media like TV and radio, events like the
Tet Offensive and the My Lai Massacre resulted in more definite splits in collective memory.
Soldiers’ sensory experiences initiated these memories, which shaped the collective memory.
However, the soldiers processed their senses in alternate ways, leading to the split in collective
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memory. Since they shared similar sensory experiences, mental trauma also varied among both
whites and blacks. All in all, the Vietnam War was an explosion of sensory elements, which has
shaped the collective memory of the United States then and today.

111

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Bellesiles, Michael A. A People's History of the U.S. Military: Ordinary Soldiers Reflect on
Their Experience of War, from the American Revolution to Afghanistan. New York: New
Press, 2012.
Caputo, Philip. A Rumor of War. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996.
Carroll, Andrew (Editor). War Letters: Extraordinary Correspondence from American Wars.
New York: Scribner, 2001.
Long, Gary. "Front-Line Soldier: De Leon Recalls Korean War Combat Duty, Letters
Home." TCA Regional News (Chicago), 2019.
O’Brien, Tim. The Things They Carried. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998.
“Report on the Psychological Warfare Conducted By the Eighth Army Units in Korea, 25 June
1950 thru 27 July 1953.” BACM Research. Paperlessarchives.com.
Smith, William Y. "Korean War Diary." Air Power History 55, no. 2 (2008): 28-43.
Spiller, Harry. Scars of Vietnam: Personal Accounts by Veterans and Their Families. Jefferson,
North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1994.
Terry, Wallace (Editor). Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans. New
York: Random House, 1984.
Secondary Sources
Appy, Chritian G. Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. Durham:
University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Burns, Ken and Lynn Novak. The Vietnam War. Directed by Ken Burns and Lynn Novak.
2017. Walpole, NH: Florentine Films, 2017, on PBS. Web.

112

Corcoran, James F.T. “The Concentration Camp Syndrome and USAF Vietnam Prisoners of
War”. Nursing & Allied Health Database. Psychiatric Annals; Nov. 1982, p. 991-994.
Donaldson, Gary A. America at War Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam,
and the Gulf War. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996.
Engelhardt, Tom. The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a
Generation. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007.
Horwitz, Allan V. PTSD: A Short History. Johns Hopkins Biographies of Disease. 2018.
Isensee, Ernst K. “Lessons Learned in the Korean Conflict.”
Keene, Judith. "Lost to Public Commemoration: American Veterans of the "Forgotten" Korean
War." Journal of Social History 44, no. 4 (2011): 1095-1113.
Kinney, Katherine. Friendly Fire: American Images of the Vietnam War. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000.
Lee, Steven Hugh. Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in
Asia, 1949-1954. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996.
Merritt, Jonathan C. "The Remembered War: The Korean War in American Culture, 19531995." Order No. 10287308, The University of Alabama, 2017.
https://search.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/remembered-war-korean-americanculture-1953-1995/docview/1986271369/se-2?accountid=27424.
“MUSIC: Listen to this Song "Where Were You (When the World Stopped Turning)" by Alan
Jackson.” September 11, 2017. https://www.iprore.com/news/music-listen-to-this-songwhere-were-you-when-the-world-stopped-turning-by-alan-jackson.
Olick, Jeffrey K., Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (Editors). The Collective Memory
Reader. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.

113

Oliver, Kendrick. The My Lai Massacre in American History and Memory. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2006.
Roberts III, Mervyn Edwin. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2018.
Smith, Mark M. Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in History.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007.
Stone, Oliver (Director). Platoon. Beverly Hills, CA: Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 1986. Netflix.
Wallace, Randall (Director). We Were Soldiers. Los Angeles, CA: Paramount, 2002. Amazon
Prime Video.

114

Fort Hays State University
FHSU Scholars Repository
Non-Exclusive License Author Agreement
I hereby grant Fort Hays State University an irrevocable, non-exclusive, perpetual license to
include my thesis ("the Thesis") in FHSU Scholars Repository, FHSU's institutional repository
("the Repository").
I hold the copyright to this document and agree to permit this document to be posted in the
Repository, and made available to the public in any format in perpetuity.
I warrant that the posting of the Thesis does not infringe any copyright, nor violate any
proprietary rights, nor contains any libelous matter, nor invade the privacy of any person or
third party, nor otherwise violate FHSU Scholars Repository policies.
I agree that Fort Hays State University may translate the Thesis to any medium or format for
the purpose of preservation and access. In addition, I agree that Fort Hays State University may
keep more than one copy of the Thesis for purposes of security, back-up, and preservation.
I agree that authorized readers of the Thesis have the right to use the Thesis for
noncommercial, academic purposes, as defined by the "fair use" doctrine of U.S. copyright law,
so long as all attributions and copyright statements are retained.
To the fullest extent permitted by law, both during and after the term of this Agreement, I
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Fort Hays State University and its directors,
officers, faculty, employees, affiliates, and agents, past or present, against all losses, claims,
demands, actions, causes of action, suits, liabilities, damages, expenses, fees and costs
(including but not limited to reasonable attorney's fees) arising out of or relating to any actual
or alleged misrepresentation or breach of any warranty contained in this Agreement, or any
infringement of the Thesis on any third party's patent, trademark, copyright or trade secret.
I understand that once deposited in the Repository, the Thesis may not be removed.
Thesis:
Author
Signat
Date:

